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ABSTRACT 
The object of this st udy has been first to examine 
briefly the post-war relations between the major European 
powers, particularly during the 1930 1 s, which served as a 
background for the diplomatic moves between Mar·ch and August 
of 1939. Secondly, the major part of the inquiry has been 
an effort to determine the fundamental national interests 
motivating Britain, France, Russia, and Germany in the negotia-
tions which culminated in the German-Russian nonaggression 
pact of August, 1939, and to give an account of these 
negotiations. 
In carrying out this study, the primary emphasis 
has been s.n examination of the official documents . Although 
not all of them oertaining to the negotiations are presently 
available, enough have been published so that a reasonably 
accurate account can be given. The French government has 
not published its official records, but the story of the 
Anglo -French negotiations with Russia is told in t he pub lished 
British documents while an account of the German- Russian 
negotiations is given in . the captured German documents. The 
Soviet government , too, has not published its orficial 
papers of the negotiations either with the Western democracies 
or with Germany. However, the articles which appeared in 
iii 
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the controlled Soviet press, the public statements made by 
the Kremlin leaders, and the available British and German 
documents ap oe ar sufficient to explain the position of the 
Moscow government . These have been the major sources used 
in the development of this thesis. 
The study has led to certain conclusions. With the 
German seizure of Prague 1n March, 1939, the Western 
democracies sought to find some comm.on ground for cooperating 
with Russia in an attempt to stop further German aggression. 
However, in the protracted negotiations which followed, it 
soon became evident that London and Paris did not see eye to 
eye with Moscow on the German question. Britain and France 
sought an arrangement with the Soviet Union which, while 
devoid of any close ties, could nevertheless be used to press 
Germany into accepting a compromise settlement of all out-
standing problems with the West . Such an agreement proved 
unacceptable to the Soviet government . 
This failure can be attributed to the developing 
international situation prior to the outbreak of World War II, 
when the Soviet Union found herself being wooed not only by 
the Western democracies but by Germany as well. Under the 
circumstances, the leaders of the Kremlin were no longer 
unduly concerned about a united anti-Soviet bloc among the 
capitalist nations . Moreover, Stalin was now in the enviable 
position o~ carrying on negotiations simultaneously with the 
Western powers and with Germany. With Hitler desperately 
seeking an agreement with Russia, Stalin finally agreed to 
V 
sign a nonaggression pact with Germany. In si gnin g this 
pact, Stalin sought to secure neutrality for the Soviet 
Union in a war which appeared imminent, while Hitler sought 
to limit the war against major powers to the western front. 
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Outoastes Seek Each Other 
The Europe which emerged after the Treaty of 
Versailles was riddled with political dissensions, not only 
between victor and va.nquished but also between victors. The 
Treaty was to prove less a guarantee ot peace and a factor 
for unity among the powers and more an instrument creating 
situations replete with future political crises . Germany, 
once a proud and powerful nation, now was humbled and 
humiliated and bitter with resentment; in many high places 
the spirit of revenge predominated . France, though a victor, 
l 1 ved in mortal fear of a rearmed Germany and sought refuge 
in a strict enforcement of the Treaty buttressed with a 
system of alliances . Great Britain pursued a different 
course, since her national interests, particularly economic, 
were not consistent with those of France. She sought a 
German market for her goods and was less insistent on a 
strict interpretation and enforcement of the Treaty pro-
visions . Defeated Russia was now almost wholly within the 
embrace of communism. Europe a£ter Versailles thus was 
comprised of a defeated but revengeful Germany, an ever 
apprehensive France, a tractable Great Britain, and an 
emerging Russian communist state . 
Soviet Russia, born of revolution, and fighting 
desperately to survive, was dedicated to the promotion of 
world revolution, at least during her early history . As 
such she posed a sizeable threat to the major Europee.n powers, 
especially France and Great Britain . These states, along 
with others, dispatched expeditionary forces to Murmansk, 
Archangel, and Vladivostok . They also gave aid to the 
anti-communist forces within Russia, but the revolution was 
successful. The new state now joined Germany as an outcaste 
in the family of nations and every attempt was made by the 
victors to keep the two apart . 
But Germany and Russia, having mu.ch to gain by 
establishing friendly relations, soon came to an understand -
ing. On April 16, 1922, Walter Rathenau and George 
Chicherin, chiefs, respectively, of the Germen and Russian 
foreign offices, signed the Treaty of Rapallo. It provided 
for the resumption of full diplomatic, consular, and trade 
~elations, and the waiving by Germany of all claims against 
Russia on account of nationalized German businesses . This 
agreement was hastened by the failure of the communist 
uprising in Germany in March, 1921, the League of Nations' 
decision on Upper Silesia which went against Germany, and 
the Germen fear of the possibility of an Anglo-Russian 
agreement. 
The agreement had its origin in the nature of the 
international relations of the period, and it was recognized 
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as such by the leaders in both countries . Thus what Lenin 
had said in December , 1920, to the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets had come to pass. That is, · a German bourgeois 
government was being pushed towards peace with Soviet Russia 
against its own will because of th e existin g international 
situation. 1 The German attitude was perhaps best expressed 
by Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the first German ambassador 
to Russia in the post-war period. He looked upon his mission 
as "the symbol of a curious but firm friends hip between two 
nations whom the cruel course of history had converted into 
outlaws, forcing them together through thick and thin, 
breathing defiance against the satiated, vi ctorious, bourgeois 
world . " 2 
Close German relations with Russia were advocated 
as early as October, 1919, by General Hans von Seeckt, the 
creator of the new Reichswehr . In a let ter to a friend, be 
wrote that an understanding with Russia was "a permanent 
aim of German policy."3 The military leaders saw the 
opportunity of rebuilding the German army and Soviet Russia 
was the lo gical place to hide such activities which were in 
violation or the Versailles Treaty. To this end Russia made 
1Edward Hallett Carr, German - Soviet Relations Between 
the Two World Wars 0 1919-1939 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, l95l), p. 4 . 
2oustav Hil ger and Alfred G. Meyer, The Incompatible 
Allies (New York: The Macmil lan Co. , 1954), p. 95 . 
3carr, German- Sovie t Relation s, 1919-1939, p . 221. 
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agreements with the German War Ministry whereby German firms 
were granted concessions in Russia to manufacture airplane 
motor s , poison gases, guns , she l ls, and tanks . l The German 
War Ministry even had an agreement with the Red Army 
whereby German pilots and tank experts were trained . 2 
For Russia, friendly relations with a defeated 
Germany served many objectives . Above all, with the cap-
italist worl d divided between the conquering Allies and 
defeat ed Germany, there was every opportuni ty through the 
medium of an understanding with Germany, to prevent the 
formation of an effective anti-Russian coalition . In 
additi on , German capital, machinery, and technical knowled ge 
could aid the Communists in transforming Russia into a 
leading worl d power . Close ties between the two countries 
would also isolate Poland, an outpost of the Western powers 
in eastern Europe . Internal conf'lict within the non - com-
munist world, therefore, was a boon to the Communists . They 
thrived on it and sought by every means to perpetuate it . 
At best, however, the relationship was an uneasy 
one . Although both nations had common enemies and common 
in t erests, there were indications of a basic incompatibility. 
At the very outset, Brockdorff-Rantzau expressed the view 
that Germany should not align herself too closely with Russia 
politically for this l-10uld prove an obstacle toward better 
relations with the West, especially with England.3 The 
1Hilger and Meyer, 1fil'-ompat1ble Allie~, pp . 194-95. 
2Ib1d . , p . 196 
)Ibid . , PP• 91 - 92 . 
possibility of a rapprochement with the Western powers on 
the part of both Germany and Russia bred suspicion . Each 
feared disloyalty of the other. This was so well reco gnized 
that diplomats in Moscow were "constantly asking themselves 
who would be the first to sell the pa.rtner down the river by 
making a deal with Poland, England, or France. 01 
The foreign policy of Gustav Stresemann, the German 
foreign minister from 1923 to 1929, wes a matter of deep 
concern to the Soviet leaders because he inaugurated a policy 
of fulfillment and accomodation toward Germany's former 
enemies. Under his leadership, Germany negotiated the 
withdrawal of French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr, signed 
the Locarno Paet which guaranteed the German frontiers with 
France and Belgium, and gained for Germany entry into the 
League of Nations . Although attempts were made to allay 
Russian fears, it did usher in a new era in the relations 
between Germany and Russia . 
Russian leaders were highly critical of Germany's 
foreign policy toward the Western powers. Even before the 
Looarno Pact and the German entry into the League of Nations, 
Chicherin on May 16, 1925, warned that for the "Soviet Union 
Germany's choice of a definitely Western orientation and 
entry into the League of Nations can objectively lead only 
to the deterioration of relations between Germany and the 
Soviet Republic . "2 · And on May 24, 1925, an editorial in 
1Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, p . 152. 
2!£g., P • 134. 
-Izvestia stated that "in the present international situation, 
orientation toward the Wost means for Germany simply an 
acknowledgment of her present subjugation and promises her 
absolutely nothing positive . "l The leaders of the Soviet 
Union were clearly concerned . 
Toward the end of February, 1926, Germany sought 
to quiet Russian fears by .proposing a formal treaty. The 
result was the signing of the Berlin Treaty on April 24, 
1926 . By its terms, each nation promised to remain neutral 
in case either were attacked by one or more powers; neither 
would join any kind of coalition or economic campaign 
directed against the other partner . This agreement repre-
sented the high point of friendly relations between the two 
countries before 1933. Deterioration was about to set 1n . 
Mania for Security 
The Berlin Treaty did not dispel the Russian fears, 
paramount after the Locarno Pacts, of a rapprochement between 
Germany and her former enemies~ Soviet leaders deemed it 
necessary, therefore, to become active on many fronts in 
the cause of Russian security . While still seeking to remain 
friendly with Germany, Soviet leaders sought security in 
neutrality and nonaggression pacts and also in fostering 
closer relations with the Western powers . To this end, they 
signed, between 1925 and 1932, numerous neutrality and 
nonag gression pacts w1th ,~e1ghbors, among them Turkey, 
lHilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, p . lJl. 
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Lith uania, Finland, Latvia, and Estonia . 
Russian fears concerning Germany were shared by 
other European countries, especiall y France. She, too, 
had sought security in a system of alliances similar to those 
of Russia . By 1927, she had concl uded some form of 
defensive alliance or agreement with Belgium, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia . With the gradual 
deterioration of German-Russian relations, 1t was perhaps 
inevitable that France and Russia would find common ground 
for establishing closer relations . In 1932 the two nations 
si gned a nonaggression pact in which each agreed to remain 
neutral in case the other were attacked without provocat i on. 
By 1932 then, German-Russian relations had cooled 
considerably and Russia sought closer ties with the Western 
powers, especially France. With Maxim Litvinov succeeding 
Chicherin as the Soviet foreign minister, Russian foreign 
policy was directed toward closer collaboration wi th the 
West, the ·main obj ective still being the prevention of an 
effectiv e anti-Russian bloc . It was still to be seen, 
however, whether Russia and the non-communist nations, in 
the face of Hitler's advent to power, could keep the peace 
of Europe. 
March of the Dictators 
Although Russia by 1932 was seeking closer relations 
with the Western powers, she did not wish to abandon entirely 
.friendly relations with Germany . This attitude prevailed 
even after Adolf Hitler had become Chancellor in January, 
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1933, and had outlawed and taken t .errorist action against 
the Communist party and agents of the Communist International. 
Many times Litvinov and Molotov expressed sentiments to the 
German representatives in Moscow for maintaining friendly 
relations with Germaey . 1 In fact, Litvinov went so far as to 
remark: "We don't care 1.f you shoot your German Communists . "2 
However, Hitler in Germany was dedicated to revision 
of the Versailles Trea ty and soon posed a serious problem 
not only to the Sovie t Union but to all of Europe. Hitler 
wasted very little time before embarking on a course which 
was to plunge Europe into one crisis after another. Follow-
ing the Saar plebiscite of March, 1935, which returned that 
area to Germany, Hit l er announced th e rearmament of Germany. 
In March, 1936, German troops marched into the Rhineland; 
1938 saw Germany annex Austria and the Sudeten l and of 
Czechoslovakia. There was clearly a need for some plan to 
arrest the German menace . 
Russian foreign policy between 19.33 and 19.36 sought 
an answer in a policy of collective security wherein Great 
Britain, France, and Russia would form an effective counter-
weight. To this end the Soviet Uni on joined the League of 
Nations 1n September, 1934; signed pacts of mutual assistance 
with both France and Czechoslovakia in May, 1935; and called 
upon the Communists · in other countries to support anti-Fascist 
groups in what came to be called the Popular Front . 
1H1l ger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, pp. 255-56. 
2
~ . , p . 252. 
But the apparent unanimity of purpose was not trans-
lated into action. There was a tendency in many European 
quarters to acquiesce and to capitulate to German demands 
be cause they saw in a strong Germany a successful force 
against communist Russ.la. It 1s true that a half-hearted 
attempt was made to enforce effective measures against Italy 
in Ethiopia; but the Civil War in Spain, the reoccupation 
of the Rhineland, and the German annexation of Austria 
clear l y showed that the foreign policy of Great Britain, 
France, and Russia toward the dictators did not rest on a 
common ground . The last act was to be played out at Munich 
where Britain and France permitted the sacrifice of the 
territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia in a futile effort 
to placate Hitler. 'What started out as collective security 
had degenerated first into collective inertia and then 
outright appeasement . 
Munich and After 
Throughout the period of increasing tension between 
Germany and Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland issue, the 
Soviet government reaffirmed 1ts treaty obligations toward 
Czechoslovakia . This view was expressed by Litvinov to the 
foreign press on March 17, 1938, 1 and to the French on 
May 12, 1938. 2 In fact, there is some evidence that Russia 
was willing to come to Czechoslovakia's aid even after that 
1Max Beloff, The Foreign Poli cy of Soviet Russia, 
1929-1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), II, 122. 
2!£!!!. , p. 131. 
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country had accepted t he Munich t erms on Septe mber JO, 
1938. 1 
The Soviet Union's position, however, did not appear 
to bo l ster that of the Wester n powers, es peciall y France and 
Great Britain . It s eemed that the y wer e willin g to make 
any con cessions concern i ng Czechosl ovakia to avoid a conflict 
with Germany . Thus at Munich they not only conceded the 
German demands against that state , but exerted diplomati c 
pressure on the orficials of Czechoslovakia to accept t h e 
agreement which they had no part in f ormulating . 
A non- parti c ipant in the Munich confere nces, Ru s s ia 
now became openly suspicious of the Western powers . She 
feared that Great Britain and France were satisfied to se e 
a s trong Germany, provided she had aggressive desi gns against 
Russia . This view waa expre s sed by Stalin to Joseph Davies, 
the American ambassador in Moscow, even before Munich . 2 The 
Munich Pact no doubt hel~ed to confirm this view and forced 
Rus sia to rea ppraise her poli cy of cooperating with the West 
against Hitler .3 
Nevil l e Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, 
s aid after t he Muni ch Conference that pea ce had been sec ured . 
He had a r ude awakening i n March, 1939, however, when Germany 
1 Max Beloff , The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 
1929-19 41 (London: Oxford University Press , 1949), II , 162 . 
2 Jo seph E. Davies, Mi s sion to Mos cow (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1941), p . 345. 
3carr, German- Soviet Relations, 1919- 1939, p . 125. 
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invaded and occupied what remained of the Czechoslovak state. 
With the occupation of Prague, the Western powers 
appeared ready to scrap their policy of appeasement whi ch 
had proved a failure . They now sounded out Russia to 
determine what obligations she was ready to assume in defend-
ing the independence of other threatened European nations . 
But it was against a background 0£ mutual distrust that London 
and Paris approached Moscow. 
CHAPTER II
ANGLO-FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
Distrust and Indecision 
In a speech to the British Parliament following the 
Munich Pact in 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
announced that he had secured "peace in our time." To the 
many who disagreed with him, the Pact was not a symbol of 
peace but another abject surrender to one who had an 
insatiable appetite for other people's territory. Unlike 
Chamberlain, they would have wagered that before long Hitler 
would be asking for more land, probably the remainder of the 
truncated Czechoslovak state. 
On March 15, 1939, German troops occu pied Prague, 
and the following day Hitler issued a decree establishing a 
protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia . By this act he 
destroyed the Munich Pact and laid bare for all to see, even 
to some of its staunchest supporters, the bankruptcy of the 
policy of appeasement. The harsh reality of events compelled 
Great Britain and Fran ce to reappraise their foreign policies 
and to formulate a more effective defense against Hitlerite 
Germ any . But the apparent transition from a course of 
appeasement to one of effe ctiv e defense could not be effected 
over night. The past could not simoly be made to vanish; and 
~12-
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as it applied to Britain and France in the field of inter-
national relations, the past was to prove a burden when it 
came to doing business with the Soviet Union to whom these 
countries now turned. 
During the 1930's and right up to March 15, 1939, 
the two major non-fascist huropean powers, Great Britain 
and Franco, had capitulated to the dictators at almost every 
turn . Many reasons have been gi ven 1n explanation. One 
view is that the great majority of the peop le in many 
countries outside the fascist nations had reached a point 
where they did not take warfare as being inevitable and 
considered it a barbarity . Germany thus took advantage of 
this consideration and by organizing and maintaining a 
strong military force was able to rea p concessions from 
people with these viewa . 1 
Of no less importance perhaps is the fact that the 
British people were hopelessly divided over questions of 
foreign policy. It was a division which had been steadily 
growing since Japan's invasion of Manchuria in Septembe r, 
1931 . In the intervening period onl y a minority of the 
people had taken a position either for or against a policy 
of appeasement or collective security. The majority 
1Royal Institute of International Affairs, Sur vey 
of International Affairs 1939-19 6 The World in March, 
, es . Arno oyn ee an Frank • shton - Gwat n 
TLoiidon: Oxford Uni versity Press, 1952), I, 34. (Here-
after cited as R. I. I. A. , Sur vey, The Worl d in March, 
1939 . ) 
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remained undecided. 1 
However undecided the majority may have been, there 
was one grou p which was leading the others down the road of 
appeasement. In the period immediately precedin g the 
outbreak of World War II the major architect of this group 
was Chamberlain. It was his belief that th e outstanding 
problems between Great Britain and Germany could be settled 
by their leaders in the same manner that disputes were 
settled by the business men in Birmingham . Furthermore, he 
took at face value Hitler's repeated assertions that his 
territorial claims were limited to the application of the 
principle of self-determination. 2 
But these are not the only explanations given for 
appeasement . A more damaging one is that it had as its 
basi c objective a clash between Russia and Germany . In 
order for this plan to succeed, Ger many had to be given 
freed om to expand in the East; and this could not be done 
without the destruction of the French alliances with Prague 
and Moscow. To this end , Austria and Czechoslovakia were 
allowed to fall into Hitler's hands . Once having allowed 
Ger many to absorb these territories, the Western powers 
hoped that Hitler's desire to liberate th3 Ukraine would 
em.broil him in a war with Russia . This was especially a 
cherished hope a1'ter Munich and a hope that "at the time was 
35- 36. 
lR . I . I . A., Survey, The World in March, 1939, I, 
2
~ . , 37. 38. 
by no means absurd."l In December of 1938 Robert Coulondre, 
the French ambassador in Berlin, reported that many German 
leaders, including Joachim von Ribbentr op and Hermann 
Goerin g, had spoken to him of the necessity for German 
expansion in the East . He informed his gov ernme nt that one 
could see little by little the outline s of a great German 
enterprise, the objective of which was mastery over central 
Eur ope and the creation of a Greater Ukraine under German 
control . This plan appeared to be accepted by the nazi 
leaders, including Hitler himself . Coulondre mentioned in 
this respect that the Ukra inian question had been a subject 
of conversation for the past ten days among the staff of the 
Natio nal-Socialist party . The aim ap peared to him well 
defined although no ways and means of achievement had as 
yet been evolved.2 
Thus it is argued that there was a tacit understand -
ing between Germany and the Western powers whereby the 
latter would tolerate German expansion to the East in 
comoe nsation for the main tenance o f the status quo in the 
West . It is further asserted that the abandonment of 
appeasement by the tlestern powers was motivated not by the 
violation of the Munich Pact by Germany but by the realizaticn 
lFrederick L. Schuman, Night Over Europe (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc . , 1941), pp. $6-$8. 
2coulondre to Bonnet, December 15, 193 8, French 
Government, The French Yellow Book, Di lomatic Documents, 
1938-1939 (New or: eyna tc coc, , pp . • J. 
(Hereafter cited as French Government, French Yellow Book . } 
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that Germany, having allowed Hungary on March 16, 1939, to 
annex the Carpatho-Ukraine, no longer would use that territory 
to attack Russia. Those who support this view conclude with 
Frederick L. Schuman that "events of March 16 revealed even 
to Chamberlain that the Ukrain ian dream was dead and that 
the Soviet Union would not be the next object of nazi 
ambition . " 1 
Whatever the real explanation for appeasement, the 
events of March 15-16 did effect a change in the foreign 
policy of both Great Britain and Fran ce toward Germany and 
Russia. This change was apparent in the speech Chamberlain 
made at Birming ham on March 17. His speech was a gene ral 
defense of his policy of appeasement together with an 
observation of the changes in the i nternat ion al situation. 
He said he had no need to defend his visits to Germany in the 
autumn of 1938 because nothing which Great Br itain, France, 
or Russia could have done '1,,0Uld ha ve saved Czechoslovakia. 
He remarked that his visits to Hitler led him to believe 
that after Munich Hit ler would have no more territorial 
claims to make in Europe. This being the cas e he expressed 
the belief that the British people at the ti me wanted him 
to follow a po licy of appeasement. 2 However, commenting on 
lNight Over Europe, p . 116. 
2Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
on International Affairs 1939-19 6, ed . Arnold J. 
ondon: Oxford Un vers ty Press, 951), I, 67-69 . 





the situation as it now existed, he said: 
It is only six weeks ago that I was speaking in 
this city, and that I alluded to rumours and sus-
pi cions which I said ought to be swept away . I pointed 
out that any demand to dominate the world by force was 
one which the democr acies must resist, and I added that 
I could not believe that such a challenge was intended, 
because no Government with the interests of its own 
people at heart could expose them for such a claim to 
the horrors of World War. 
And ••• it seems incredible that we should see 
such a challen ge . I feel bound to repeat that ••• 
no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that, 
be cause it believes war to be a senseless and cru el 
thing, this nation has so lost its fibre that it will 
not take part to the utmost of its powfr in resisting 
such a challenge if it ever wer e made . 
These statements appeared to portend the end of 
appeasement and the adoption of a more vigorous policy aimed 
against further German expansion . But the question was: 
What po l i cy would be moat effective? One altern ative un-
doubtedly was fairly obvious-- cl oser collaboration with 
Russia . However, there were drawbacks here, because some 
leaders in the British government had keen misgivings about 
Russia . One of these was Chamberlain . On March 26 he wrote: 
I must confess to the moat profound distrust of 
Russia . I have no belief whatever in her ability to 
maintain an effective offensive, even if she wanted 
to . And I distrust her motives, whi ch s eem to me to 
have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and 
to be conce~ned only with getting every one else by 
the ears . Moreover, she is both hated and suspected 
by many of the smalle~ States, notably by Poland, 
Rumania, and Fin land. 
But if the British ruling circles distrusted Russia, 
1R. I. I . A. , Documents, 19)9-1946, I, 71. 
2Keith Felling, The Life of Nevi lle Chamberlain 
(London : Macmi l lan & Co. Ltd . , 1946), p. 403. 
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so did the Russian leaders distrust the Western democracies. 
In 1938 they were fairly certain that the Chamberlain 
government would make some kind of agreement with Hitler . 
This belief was heightened, if not confirmed, by the Munich 
Pact . However, it appears that the belief had not yet been 
adopted finally and unanimously by the Soviet leaders.l 
Their ms.in preoccupation after Munich was to determine 
whether Germany in the role of aggressor would be aided 
either directly or indirectly by Great Britain and France, 
or whether these nations would help in destroying Germany. 2 
In the weeks preceding the occupation of Prague, 
many harsh statements were made by Russian leaders con-
demning the Western powers . It was left to Stalin, however, 
to voice the gravest and most definitive suspicions. This 
he did in an address to the Eighteenth Congress of the 
Communist Party on March 10, 1939. He accused the Western 
powers of rejecting a policy or collective security for 
one or non-intervention for the sole purpose of promoting 
war between the aggressor nations and Russia so that at 
the end, with the belligerents weakened , they could impose 
the conditions of peace . The aggressor was allowed to take 
Austria and the Sudetenland after which the Western powers 
used the press to lie about the weakness of the Russian 
armed forces and internal difficulties. All this was done 
in an attempt to egg Germany on to attack the Sovi et Union . 
I, 49. 
lR. I . I. A. , Survez, The World in March, 1939, 
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Stalin warned "that the bi g and dangerous politi cal game 
started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention 
may end in a serious fiasco for them." 1 
Thus, as late as March 10, five days before Germany 
occupied the rest or Czechoslovakia, it was Stalin's con -
viction that Britain and France were not much interested in 
arresting Germany's expansion moves nor in preventing war . 
He believed that they desired a war in which they, not being 
participants , could emer ge as arbite rs. 
This, then, was essentially the nature of the 
relations between the democratic powers and Russia prior to 
' ' 
the negotiations which were s~o~f~~o get unde rway 1n an 
effort to prevent further German aggression in eastern 
Europe . 
Initial Anglo - French Moves 
With Czechoslovakia hav i ng fallen into the German 
orbit, there was increased diplomatic activity be tween 
Great Britain, France, and other Europ ean nations con-
cernin g the possibi lit y of new Ger man moves, this ti me 
against Poland, Romania, and Lithuania . Warnings came from 
many quarters . In Paris, a represehtative of the French 
foreign office told Sir Eric Phipps, the British ambassador, 
that he expected Germany to move soon against Danzi g and 
lRoyal Institute or International Affairs, Soviet 
Documents on Forei 1, ed . Jane Degrass 
on: Oxford Un 3) , III, 319-20. 
(Hereafter cited as R. I . I. A. , Soviet Documents.) 
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Memel.1 In London, the Romanian minister informed the 
British Foreign Office that Germany had serve d Romania wi th 
a virtual ultimatum concerning a trade agreement. 2 From 
Berlin, the British charg~ d'affaires reported that at a 
meeting which had taken place with the Lithuanian mini ster 
for foreign affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German 
foreign minister, demanded that Memel should be handed over 
"graciously to Germany."3 And from Ber lin Coulondre reported 
an of£1cial of the German Propaganda Ministr y as s ay ing that 
"we have before us so many open doors, so many possibili-
ties, that we no lon ger know which way to turn, or what 
direction to take."4 
These warnings concerning future German moves 
proved to be timel y . On March 21, in Berlin, Ribbe ntrop 
had some compl ai nts and demands to mak~ of the Polish 
ambassador, Joseph Lipski. After remar kin g that a "cert a in 
constraint had graduall y manifested itself in German-Polish 
relations," Ribbentrop complained about anti-German incidents 
in Danzig by Poli sh students and the anti-Reich tone of the 
Polish papers. He also pressed for the ret urn to Germany of 
1Ph1pns to Halifax, March 17, 1939, E. L. Woodward 
and Rohan Butler (eds.), Documents on British Forei n Polic, 
1919-1939, Third Series ( ondon: s a esty's Stationery, 
1951), IV, 363. (Herea fter cited as Woodward & Butler, 
Documents . ) 
2Hal1fax to Hoare, March 17, 1939, Ibid ., 367 . 
3ogilvie-Forbes to Halifax, March 20, 1939, 
Woodward and Butler, Documents, Third Series, IV, 398 . 
4coulondre to Bonnet, Fre nch Government, French 
Yellow Book, p . 106. 
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the city of Danzig and for an extra-territorial highway and 
railway connection across the Corridor linking Germany prope r 
with East Prussia . In reporting to his home government, 
Lipski warned that "Germany has resolved to carry out her 
Easter n prog ra.'1lme quickly, and so desires to have Poland's 
attitude clearly defined . " 1 As for Romania., a trade ag ree -
ment was signed between that country and Ger many on March 
23 . 2 That same day Germany formally annexed the Memel 
Territory . 3 
With distress signals now flyin g over many European 
countries and the tenor of diplomatic dispatches showing 
increasing anxiety, there was a clear need for ~nity and 
effective action among the anti-German forces . The French 
government agreed "that · France and Great Britain should 
decide on a common attitude and considers that if German 
enterprise succeeded (even if directed for the moment only 
towards the East) it would res ult in German hegemony over 
Euro pe with all the menaces whi ch this woul d entail to vital 
interests of France and Great Britain."4 
The two immediate dan ge r spots seemed to be Poland 
and Romania . From Par is, the British arabassador reported 
that Josef Beck, the Polish foreign minister, had asked 
1R. I. I. A. , Documents, 1939-1946, I, 113 . 
2
~ . , 117 ... 18. 
3Ibid . , 115- 16. 
4campbell to Halifax, March 20 , 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, IV, 397. 
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the French government whether it would help in cas e of a 
German attac k against Danzig. The French government had 
agreed to give aid provided a defensive alliance could be 
negotiated between Poland and Romania. 1 The French con-
sidered the latter state the last obstacle in the way of 
German control of the resources of central and ea stern 
Europe and ex pressed readiness to aid her with or without t he 
assistance of other nations. 2 Similar inquiries by Poland 
and Romania were made of the British government . 
The British and Prench first foc used their attention 
on Romania . On March 17, Sir Howard Kennard, the British 
ambassador in Warsaw, inquired of Beck if the Polish- Rom9J11an 
Treaty of 1931 would be erfective against Germany . Beck 
replied t hat "that alliance with its military conventions 
only envisaged RUBsia as ag gressor . 113 Kennard saw Beak 
again the following day and asked him what the attitude of 
Poland would be toward any aggressive German moves against 
ttomania . Beck re plied that he would have to go into the 
matter more fully with the ttoman1an government and with 
his own. When Kennard reminded him of the remark he had 
made on March 17 that the alliance between Homania and Poland 
aimed only at Russia, Beck replied "that this · was so but 
lphipps to Halifax, March 18, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, IV, 372. 
2
campbell to Halifax, March 20, 1939, Ibid., 397. 
3Ke~ard to Halifax, March 17, 1939, ~ . , 363. 
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that of course the Polis h Government would be vitally 
l interested in any threat to Roumanian inde pendence." The 
British ambassador saw Beck again on March 20 at which time 
. 
Beck was as evasive as ever, saying that Romania had not 
informed Polpnd of any danger. Beck's vice-minister of 
.foreign affairs, however, viewed the situation with more 
seriousness. 2 
Meanwhile, Britain had made contact with the Soviet 
gov ernment. This approach followed the statement made in 
London on March 15, by the Russian ambassador, Iv an Maisky. 
He said at the time " that at present there is no conflict of 
interest bet ween the U. S. S. R. and the British Empire in 
any part of the world. • • that in the last resort the 
fate of peace or war in our time depends on the kind of rela. 
tions between London and Moscow . 113 On March 17 Vicount 
Halifax, the British foreign minister, called upon the 
British ambassador in Moscow, Sir William Seeds, to inquire 
immediately of the Soviet government "whether they can 
give any indication that they l«>uld, if requested by 
Roumanian Government, activel y help the la t ter to resist 
German aggression."4 
Bu tler, 
1Kennard to Halifax, March 18, 1939, 
Documents, Third Series, I V, 371. 
2 
~-, 401 . 
Woodward and 
3w. P. and Zelda K. Coates, A Histo~y of Anglo- Soviet 
Relations (London: Lawrence & Wishe .rt, 1944), p. 603, 
quotin g Daily Tele graph and Daily Herald, March 16, 1939. 
4He.lifax to Seeds, March 17, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, IV, 361. 
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The following day Seeds pu t the question to Maxim 
Litvinov, the Russian commissar for foreign affairs. Afte r 
remarkin g that a reply would be made later, Litvinov had 
some precise questions to ask, among which were the following: 
Did Seeds have any indication of the course which Great 
Britain would take in the matter? Did Great Bri tain wish 
the Soviet Union to take an engagement while leaving her 
own hands free? What was the nature of the British reply to 
the German note announcing the fait accomE11 with regard to 
Czechoslovakia? Seeds did not an swer all these questions. 
He told Litvinov that the basis of any decision by Great 
Britain would rest on the attitude of those countries con-
cerned . He added that Chamberlain's speec h of March 17 at 
Bi rmingham set forth the British government's attit ude 
toward Germany's action against Czechoslov ak ia . Litvinov als:> 
wanted to know .why the Romanian government had not approached 
the Soviet Union directly . To this "mo·st awkward question " 
Seeds had no answer . 1 
The Soviet government's reply was made on March 18. 
Seeds reported Litvinov as saying tha t "no good purpose would 
be served by various Governments enquirin g of each other in 
turn what action others would take before making up their 
own minds." The Soviet government instead pr oposed a meeting 
in Bucharest of delegates appointed by the British, French, 
Soviet, Polish, and Romanian governments to discuss the 
1se eds to Halifax, March 18, 1939, Woodwar d and 
Butler, Documents, Third Serie s, I V, 372. 
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possibilit1es or common action. 1 The Soviet gov ernment 
thought that holding the conference in Bucharest would have 
a psychological effect on both Bucharest and Berlin. 2 
On March 19, Halifax told Maisky that Britain had 
no desire to waste time in long diplomatic exchanges. 
However, there were two diffic u lties with Litvinov 1 s proposed 
six-power conference: first, Britain could not under the 
present circumstances send a responsible minister to the 
conference; and secondly, to hold such a conference without 
prior certainty t ha t it would be successful was dangerous. 3 
Maieky was told that the British government was presently 
working on a formula whereby Britain, Franc e , Poland, and 
Russia could publicly assert their unity, thereby achieving 
the same objectives that Litvinov sought to achieve in a 
conference . This proposed declaration W>uld serve both as 
a warning to Germany and as a rau.lying point for the smaller 
states.4 Maisky informed his goverrunent that the British 
considered the Soviet proposal for a six - power conference 
11premature.u5 
The reasons the British gave for rejecting the 
Soviet government's proposal for a six-power conference are 
1seeda to Halifax, March 19, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, IV, 385. 
2Hal1fax to Seeds, March 19, 1939, ~ . , 392. 
3Halirsx to Se eds, March 19, 1939, Ibid . , 392. 
4Ib1d . , 392-93. 
5seeds to Halifax, March 21, 1939, ~ . , 429. 
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not convincing. The nature of Chamberlain's speech at 
Birmingham on March 17, the British note to the Soviet 
government on March 18, and the generally feverish diplomatic 
soundings of other European governments appeared to belie 
them. Under these circumstances, it appears incredible that 
the ~ritish government should reject the proposed six-power 
conference because (l) it couldn't send -a responsible 
minister and (2) it feared that holding such a conference 
without prior certainty of success would be dangerous . 
Clearly the British government was exhibiting an inconsistent 
attitude. While it recognized the seriousness of the German 
threat, there was also hesitation to make definite commit-
ments with the Soviet Union. 
Having rejected the call for a six-power conference, 
Britain now proposed a Four-Power Declaration by France, 
Russia, Poland, and Great Britain. It was to read:- "We 
the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect, hereby 
declare that, inasmuch as peace and security in Europe are 
matters of common interest and concern, and since European 
peace and security may be affected by an action which consti-
tutes a threat to the political independence of any European 
State, our respective Governments hereby undertake immediately 
to consult together as to what steps should be taken to 
l 
offer joint resistance to any such action . " 
When this proposal for a declaration was presented 
1Hal1fax to Phipps and Seeds, March 20, 1939, 
Woodward and Butler, Documents, Third Series, IV, 400. 
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to Litvinov, he said that agreement on it could be more 
easily obtained by a conference. It was also his belief 
that Poland would not accept. 1 Nevert heles s, one day later 
the Soviet government accepted the Britis h pro posa l, provided. 
Poland and France did likewise . 2 France accepted on 
March 2J . 3 
The proposal soon encountered difficulties, however. 
When it was first presented to Beck, he expressed misgivings 
that the Soviet Union would be one of the parties, and 
said that Poland might be able to associate herself with 
Brit ai n and France if the Soviet Union were omitted.4 In 
its reply, the Polish government rejected the propo sal 
for fear that it would provoke a German attack on Poland. 
' I Instead, t rutou gh its ambassador in London, the Polish 
government proposed a bil a teral understanding with Great 
Brite.in. > The ambassador warned that "a ra ppr~ che ment bet ween 
Poland and Russia might have disastrous results . "6 
On March 29 Maisky was told that Great Britain was 
no longer pursuing the Four- Power Declaration and that 
along with France it was considerin g another course of 
1seeds to Halifax, March 21, 1939, Wo dward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, IV, 429. 
2
~ . , 467. 
3c ampbell to Halifax, March 23, 1939, ~ . , 490 -91. 
4Kennard to Halif'ax, March 22, 19.39, ~-. 453. 
5Halif'ax to Kennard, March 24, 1939, ~-, .500. 
6!£g . , 502 . 
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action . Gr eat Britain now sou ght to ascertain the nature 
of the resista nce that Poland and Romania were ready to 
follow with a vie w toward gi ving assurance to these two 
countries . Halifax also told Maisky that Poland and Romania 
"would no doubt be glad of the sympathy and indeed of t he 
active assistance of the Soviet Union, in whatever way 
might seem most su itabl e and effectivo . 111 Thus the second 
attempt to reach an agre ement with the Soviet Union ended 
in fail ure. 
The British and French governments were very 
sensitive to Polis h and Romanian misgivings about Russia . 
The Poles were not pressed to accept the Four - Power 
Declaration . Poland and Romania were considere d the corne?'-
stone of any effective anti-German coalition . This was 
evident from some of the statements made by the British and 
French forei gn ministers. George Bonnet, t he French foreign 
minister, told the British that whatever the plan, Poland's 
cooperation was so necessary that "it was desirable ••• to 
go to the utmost limit, even to the extent of threats, to 
bring Poland in . 112 For his part , Halifax said that "in any 
scheme, the inclusion of Poland i s vital as th e one strong 
Power bordering on Germany in the East, and th e inc l usion 
of Roumania is also of the fir s t importance, since Roumania 
may be the State prima rily menaced by Germany's plans for 
lHalifax to Seeds, March 29, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Thi r d Series, IV, 544. 
2
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-29-
Eastern expansion." 1 
Followin g t he re j ection of the Four- Power Decl ara -
tion by Poland, the British and French gove rnments dec i ded 
on a new course of action. They now proposed to aid both 
Poland and Romania if the inde pendence of e ither state were 
threatened by Germany . This aid would be contin ge nt, howevea:; 
on two factors : (1) their willin gness to r ~tlis t; and (2) 
the conclusion of a mutual def ense treaty aimed a t Germany . 2 
In the ensuing negoti ations be tween Poland and Romania, 
there was evidence of much distrust of each other . Romania 
feared that an eventual agreement between Poland and Germany 
would inevitably lead to an Hungarian attack against he r.3 
For her part, Poland did not wish to antagonize Hungary. 
So in the end, this atte mpt failed too. 
The question naturally arises: Did not the British 
and French governments think the Soviet Union could be of 
help in thwarting Germany? The answer is they did, but in 
a peculiar sort of way. The Soviet Union was to be kept on 
the sidelines ready to jump into the fitay at th e nod of 
one of the probabl e victims of ag gression. But meanwhile, 
there was to be no prior agree ment with her callin g for 
automatic a ction beca u se this might provoke a German at tack. 
In other words, Russian assistance was des i red only when 
l:aalifax to Kennard, March 27, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, DocUillents, Third Series, IV, 516. 
2~. 
JEoare to Halifax, April 2, 1939, ~., 578. 
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and if it was called for. There were to be no firm commit-
ments with her . Perhaps Seeds best summed up this attitude 
when he expressed the wish for Anglo-Soviet relations to 
be "friendliness and contact s but no obli ga tions . 111 In the 
weeks to come, contacts would be numerous, oblig a tions 
would be nil, and friendliness would be all but absent. 
The British government made no further approach to 
the Soviet Union again before April 15. Meanwhile, Poland 
replaced Romania as the .focal point for a possible German 
attack . On March 30 the British ambassador 1n Warsaw was 
instructed to determine whether the Polish government would 
be 1n accord with a statement that Prime Minister Chemberlam 
was prepared to make in the House of Commons the next day 
concerning a British and French guarantee to Poland . 2 Beck 
accepted without hesitation . 3 The Soviet ambassador wasn't 
informed of this statement until a few hours before it was 
made . 4 The statement by Chamberlain was as follows: 
As the House is aware, certain consultations 
are now pr oceeding with other Governments . In order 
to make pe rfectly clear the position of His Maje sty's 
Government in the meantime before those consultations 
are con cluded, I now have to inform the House that 
during that period, in the event of any action whioh 
clear l y threatened Polish independence, and which the 
Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to 
resist with their national forces, His Majesty's 
1seeds to Halifax, March 28, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Document s , Third Series, IV, 524. 
2Hal1fa.x to Kennard, March 30, 1939, ~ . , 546. 
3Kennard to Halifax., March JO, 1939, !.£!.!!. , 548. 
4m, ltfax to Seeds, March 31, 1939, Ibid . , 557. 
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Government would feel themselves bound at once to 
lend the Polish Government all support in their 
power. They· have given the · Polish Governmen t an 
assuran ce to this eff ect . 
I may add that the French Government have 
authorised me to make it plain that they stand in 
the same pofition in this matter as do his Maje sty's 
Government . 
On April 13 Chamberlai n announced in the House of 
Commons that Britain and France were extendin g guarantees 
also to Romania and Gree ce. 2 Unquesti onably, the British 
and French governments had concluded that an understanding 
with Russia could wait . However, in granting these 
guarantees they committed themselves beforehand to fight any 
further German ag gression. They indirectl y brought to t he 
Soviet government the advantages it might have gained by a 
direct agreement with the Western powers. Britain and 
France had actually thrown away a major bargaining point 
which they could have used to good advantage not only with 
Poland and Romania but also in the forthcoming negotiations 
with the Soviet government . 
Bri t ain and France had given these guarantees without 
consultations with the Soviet government . However, they 
now embarked on negoti a tions with that government, the 
main objective of which was to get it also to bolater these 
guarantees . 
Declarations or Triple Alliance? 
It was obvious that Great Britain and France frowned 
l R. I . I . A. , Documents, 1939 - 1946, I, 126 . 
2 
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on close collaboration with the Soviet Union . Nev ertheles s , 
this did not preclude some measure of common effort. An 
attempt along this line was sugg ested by Seeds to Halifax 
on April 6 . He felt some good could be ac hieved if Halifax 
informed the Soviet e.rnbassador of the possibility of con-
s idering Litvinov ' s proposal for a conference of some kindf 
Again on April 13 Seeds expressed the hope that some means 
could be found to prevail on Poland an d Romania to acce ot 
the idea of some form of Soviet military as s istance . "Such 
acceptance to be notified !!2!! and not put off until an 
outbreak of war when this country might be tempte d to follow 
counsels of prudence or worse . "2 
Meanwhile, in London and Paris, the Soviet 
ambassador, while critical of British and French forei gn 
policy, express~d a desire on the part of the Soviet govern-
... 
m.ent to cooperate in roainta1ning peace. In London, Me.isky 
told Halifax he could not understand why Brit a in and France 
had not made their aid to Poland and Romania condi t ional 
on their adoption of a reasonable attitude towards the 
ac ceptance of Russian help . He further remarke d that 
bilateral pacts were not enough, that t here was a. need for 
cooperation among all countries in a system of collective 
security . 3 On April 14 Maisky ~nformed the British Foreign 
lseeds to Halifax, April 6, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, V, 45. 
2seeds to Halifax, April 13, 1939, ~ ., 104. 
3Halifax to Seeds, April 11, 1939, Ibid . , 83. 
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0ffice that the Soviet government was prepared to give 
assurances to Romania . The Soviets wished to know, however, 
the best methods and the part various powers were willing 
to assume in helping Romania. 1 Statements in a similar 
vein were also made in Paris by the Soviet ambassador .2 At 
least outwardly there were expressions from British, French, 
and Russian sources for some measure of collaboration. The 
way seemed to be clear for further negotiations. 
Both the British and French made proposals to Moscow. 
The French were the first to make an approach. On April 
14 Bonnet proposed to the Soviet ambassador an Annex to the 
Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. This Annex provided for Russian 
assistance to France should she find herself at war with 
Germany either through a direct attack upon her or through 
rendering help to Romania or Poland. Although the French 
government later joined in support of the British proposal, 
it did not completely withdraw its own.3 
It was on April lS that the Bri t ish government con-
veyed its proposal in a note to Litvinov .4 The note indicated 
that in light of Stalin's speech of March 10 that the 
Soviet Union stood ready to render aid to nations which 
are victims of aggression and which will fight for their 
201-02. 
1woodward and Butler, Documents, Third Series, V, 
2seeds to Halifax, April 14, 1939, ~ . , 199. 
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independence, "it would therefore seem to be in complete 
accord with this policy were the oviet Government now to 
make a public declaration on their own initiative in which, 
after referring to the gener al statement of policy alluded 
to above and to statements recently made by His Majesty's 
Government and th e French Government, they would re pea t 
that in the event of any act of ag gre ssi on against country 
concerned, the assistance of the Soviet Government would 
be available, if desired, and would be af forded in such 
manner as would be found most convenient . 111 
The Soviet re ply to the British proposal was made on 
April 17. In es sence, the Kremlin submitted the following 
proposals: (l) a triple alliance between Great Britain, 
France, and the Soviet Union providing for mutual assistance 
in case ot aggression against any of the contracting powers; 
(2) guarantees of military assistance by Great Britain, 
France, and the Soviet Union to all Eur opean states located 
between the Baltic and Black Seas; (3) the simultaneous 
signing of the political and military agreements . 2 These 
proposals left no doubt that if there were to be any agree-
ment between the Soviet government and the Western powers, 
every "1" would have to be dotted and every "t" crossed. 
It was fairly obvious that Downing Street, while 
seeking some measure of collaboration with th e Soviet Union, 
1Halifax to Seeds, April 14, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, V. 206. 
2se eds to Halifax, April 18, 1939, ~ . , 228-29. 
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was not, however, prepared to conclude any definite agree -
ment. Following his visit in London from April 23 to 26, 
it was the opinion of Gri gore Gafencu, the Romanian foreign 
minister, that "the British Government, aware of Poland 's 
opposit ion and of Roun1ania' s reservations • • • su ggested th e 
u se of circumloc u tion and ambigu1ty." 1 The Polish a.m.bassadcr 
in London wrote in a si milar vein when he reported to his 
home government on April 26, that a political treaty of 
reciprocal aid between Russia on t he one hand and Britain 
and France on -the other was "unacceptable to Great Britain 
and not desired by France. "2 Halifax himself tol Gafencu 
that since Poland and Romania would want to accept Russian 
help, "1t was desirable not to cold-shoulder Soviet Russi a 
too much . "3 And speakin g to Beck about relations with the 
Soviet Union, Halifax aske d if the problem was not "how to 
get a maximum degree of collaboration t'rom Soviet Russia 
without entailing dangerous consequences . "4 
While reflecting to some degree the r eserve of the 
Br itish gov ernment, the Quai d'Orsay nevertheless indicated 
a desire to con c lude some kind of an agreement with the 
Soviet Union . Concern ing the negotiations then unde ·rway, 
1Grigore Ga.fencu, The Last Days of Europ e, trans. 
E. Fletcher - Allen {New Haven: Yale Univer sity Pre ss, 1948), 
p . 126. 
2L. B. Namier, .!2.!Elomatic Prelude, 1938-1939 
(London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd , 1948), p. 22. 
3woodward and Butler, Documents, Third Series, V, 
312. 
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·oafencu has written that "the British Government was 
in clined to leave the initiative to the French Government, 
which showed real ardor and a lively desire to bring them 
to a head." 1 There was further evidence of ·this desire in 
the note handed to the British ambassador in Paris on 
April 24 concerning the Sovie t proposals of April 18. In 
thi _s note, the Paris government exuressed the view th at an 
agreement could be reached with Russia only on a basis of 
reciprocity. This approach was somewhat different from 
that put forth in t he British proposal of April 15 which 
in effect called upon Moscow to give unilateral gue rantees 
to Poland and Romania .2 
But before making a reply to the Soviet pr opo sals 
of Apri l 17, the Briti sh sought action on another dipl?matic 
front. Having introduced milita~y conscription on April 26, 
it now suggested to the French government that it make an 
attempt to establish contact with the Italian government. 
This proposal was conveyed to Bonnet on April 27 at which 
time he infor med the British ambassador that Count Galeazzo 
Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, had expressed to the 
French ambassador the Italian desire for a free port at 
Jibuti, two Italian directorships on the Suez Canal Board, 
and the extensi on of the 1896 agreement regarding Tun1s.3 
lGafencu, Last Days of Eur ope, p . 127. 
2Ph1pps to Hali fax, April 24, 1939, Woodward and 
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As for the possibilit y of Fr anco-Italian ne gotiations, the 
French ambassador was reported to have said that "it would 
be utterly criminal to let this chance slip . "1 
These diplomatic feelers in the direction of 
Mussolini, who had committed his shar e of aggressio n in 
Eur ope and Africa, smacked of more ap p easement, especially 
in light of his seizur e of Albania on April 7. It wou l d 
not appear that this move was consistent with British pro-
nouncements aga inst ag gressors and th e ne gotiations then 
underway with the Soviets . 
As it concerned negotiations with Moscow, an 
important change took place . On May 3 Litvinov was replaced 
by Vyacheslav Molotov as commissar for foreign affairs. In 
reporting to his government, the British ambassador said 
that Litv1nov's removal might imply the abandonm ent of a 
policy of collective security with which he was closel y 
associated . It was his belief, however, th at the communist 
government would follow a policy of collaboration "to a 
degree which may be found embarrassing . " Although th e 
British ambassador didn't think that the Soviet government 
was prepared to come to terms with the Axis Powers, he, 
neverthe le ss, exp ected diffic ulty 1n dealing with Molotov. 2 
Tb.ere has since been much conjecture about the 
si gnificance of Litvinov's departure. It has been said 
1Phipps to Halifax, April 28, 1939, Woodward and 
Butle r, Documents, Third Series, V, 800. 
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that the date of his resignation must be regarded as the 
turning point in the relations between the Western powers 
and the Soviet Union. Litvinov stood for collective security 
and so long as he re mained in office certain groups with in 
the Soviet hierarchy still thought Hitler could be checkedl 
It has also been said that Joseph Stalin was already think-
ing about a new course of action in case negotiations with 
the Western powers failed. Any agreement with Germany would 
necessitate Litvinov 1 s removal. It was r umored that Andrei 
Zhdanov , Leningrad party boss, Premier Vyacheslav Molotov, 
and possibly Marshal Klementi Voroshilov were said to favor 
a deal with Hitler should London fail to meet the Soviet 
terms. 2 In his final report on November 6, 1939, the former 
Polish ambassador in Moscow wrote that Litvin ov's removal 
was the signal for an agreement with Germany and the instiga-
tion of war .3 
It may or it may not be true that Litvinov's 
dismissal was a signal for a change in Soviet foreign 
poli cy. It was pro bably not such a definite about face. 
What can be said is that the Soviet leaders had concl ud ed 
that, with the Briti sh and French hesitating to come t.o a 
definite agreement over measures to take against further 
German aggression, it was necessary to dismi ss Litvinov, the 
l R. I. I . A., Sur vey, The World in March, 1939, 
2schuman, Night Over Europe, p. 233. 
3R. I . I. A. , Documents, 1939- 1946, I, 435. 
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foremost promoter of collective security during the 1930's. 
This \oDUld make it possible not only to continue negotia-
tions with the Western powers but also to capitalize on any 
overtures that the Germans might make towards them. Thus, 
the Soviet Union would be in a favorable position from which 
she could carr y on talks simultaneously with Britain and 
France on one side and Ger many on tha other. 
Coincident with Litvinov•s removal, there were 
f resh rumors concerning the po ssibil ity of a German- Russian 
raporochement . There was nothin g new about these rumors . 
As far back as 1934 Wil liam C. Bullit t had given such a 
warning . 1 Now with Litvinov out the warnings were varied 
and pe rsistent. On May 7 the Fren ch ambassador in Berlin, 
Coulondre, reported to his government that a person close 
to the Fuehrer and other hi gh nazi officials had al lude d to 
the possibility of a Ger man understandin g with Russia. This 
informant told him that Hitler would achieve his ends with -
out the Al l ies "havin g any reason, or ev en any intention to 
intervene . " He went further and commented that 11we shall 
soon see that something is brewin g in the East . " Se eing a 
close relationship between what he had r eported and Litvinov•s 
resignation, th e French ambassador commented that "especial-
ly as regards Russia, one cannot help being str uck by the 
" coinciden ces between the intentions attributed to the Fuhrer 
1Joseph Alsop ·and Robert Ki ntner. American White 
Paper (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1940), p . 52. 
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and the resignation of rt... Litvinov. 111 On May 8, 1939, the 
British a.mbassador, Sir Nevi le Henderson , conveyed to his 
government "JIU.Ch the same information . He also reported 
that t he German press comment on Molotov's appointment had 
been without the usual anti-Bolshevik abuses. 2 And from 
Moscow, Seeds reported a lack of direct press attacks on 
Germany and also the belief of some of his foreign colleagues 
who vi ewed Litvinov's dismissal as a blow to the Western 
powers . 3 
It was against such a background of rumors, coupled 
with a degree of French flexibility and contin ued British 
reserve, that a reply was f rara ed to the Soviet proposals of 
April 17 . The Paris gove rnment expressed the view that 
there was a need for reciprocity in the negotiations with , 
the Kremlin and that any new proposal similar to the one 
addressed to it on April 15 would result in failure . However, 
the French expressed a willingness to support the new British 
proposal . 4 On April 25 Seeds,too,expressed the view that to 
repeat the Br i tish pr oposal of A;>ril 15 nwould merely 
confirm them in the belief that we are trying to evade 
associations with this country's efforts . "5 
1coulondre to Bonnet, May 7, 1939, Fre nch Government, 
French Yellow Book, p . 145-46 . 
2Henderson to Halifax, May 8, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, V, 463 . 
3seeds to Halifax, Mey 7, 1939, Ibid., 460. 
4Phipps to Halifax, May 3, 1939, ~ . , 404-0 5 . 
5seeds to Halifax, April 25, 1939, ~ - , 319. 
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In consultations with other governments, the British 
made it known that their negotiations with the Soviet 
government were dictated by the following basic considera-
tions: (l) acceptance of Soviet help only where desired and 
to forms acceptable to the countries concerned; (2) reluctance 
to impose guarantees on any country; and (3) erection of a 
barrier against further aggression in eastern ~'urope. 
Halifax stated that the Soviet government's reply of April 18 
took little account of "practical difficulties." He still 
felt that the British proposal of April 15, with perhaps 
some modification, was the best plan. 1 
On May 8 Seeds saw Molotov and conveyed to him the 
British reply to the Soviet proposals of April 18. Seeds 
first told Molotov that the Soviet proposals were unaccepta-
ble because (1) they would require too long to negotiate, 
and (2) they provided for automatic assistance to Poland in 
disregard of that nation's wish against any immediate and 
public association with the Soviet Union for fear it would 
provoke a German attack . Seeds then gave Molotov a copy of 
the new British proposal emphasizing that it called for 
Soviet assistance only after Britain and France had become 
involved in war in fulfilment of their guaranttes to Poland 
and Romania . 2 The British proposal was s.s follows: "It 
is suggested that the Soviet Government should make a public 
1Halifax to Phipps, April 23, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, V, 26 7- 68 . 
2seeds to Halifax, May 9, 1939, Ibid . , 484-85. 
• 
declaration on their own initiative, in which after re f erring 
to the general statement of policy recently made by M. Stalin 
and having regard to the statements recently made by His 
Majesty's Government and the French Government, accepting 
new obligations on behalf of certain Eastern European 
countries, the Soviet Government would undertake that in 
fulfilment of these obligations, the assistance of the Soviet 
Government would be immediately available if desired and . 
woul d be afforded in such manner and on such terms as might 
be agreed . 111 
At this meeting on May 8 Seeds wrote that Molotov 
subjected him · to a "relentless cross examination . " He 
wanted to know whether Britain meant to start military 
conversations at once . Seeds replied that Britain considered 
a Soviet declaration without starting military talks was 
a ll that was required at the moment , but that the London 
government would be glad to discuss such points if the 
Soviets gave the British proposal for a declaration friendly 
cona1derat1on . Molotov also wanted to know whether Britain 
had guaranteed Holla~d, Belgium, and Switzerland . Seeds at 
first tried to evade an answer by replying that this subject 
was outside his field, but when Molotov persisted he finally 
remarked that the Low Countries had always been considered 
vital to Britains' defenses . In the further course of the 
conversation, Mold;ov told Seeds that Soviet policy had not 
1woodward and Butler, Documents, Third Series, 
V, 487. 
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changed, but added ominou s l y that " it was liable to be altered 
if other States chan ged theirs . " Seeds r epo rted to his 
governmen t tha t h e had had a "so mewhat trying interview . "1 
Cert a inly the British had good reasons for believing 
that th e Communists would not accept any proposal which was 
not based on compl e te reci procit y as it concer ned all st ates 
borderin g on the Soviet Union. Even before the start of the 
ne gotiations, Soviet leaders were su spicious of British and 
French actions. Seeds inter pr e ted as much in Stalin ' s speech 
of March 10, when he reported th a t "the ch ief care of the 
r ulers or · th i s country must be to prevent it from bein g drawn 
into a conflict which does not concern 1t." 2 And referrin g 
to Stalin's passa ge where he advised his party members "to 
be cautious and not allo w Soviet Russia to be dra wn into 
conflicts by war mongers who are accusto med to have others 
pull the chestn uts out of the fire," Seeds warned against 
thinkin g that the Soviet Union was sim ply waitin g f or an 
invitation from the Western democracies to he l p stop 
ag gression.3 Again on Aprill followin g the British rejection 
of the Soviet pr oposed six-power conferen ce and t he aban-
donment of the Four- Power Declaration, Litvinov told Seeds 
that the " Soviet Government had had eno ugh and . would hen ce-
forward stand apart free of any commitments . 114 Under t hese 
1s eeds to Halifax, May 9, 193 9, Woodward and Butler , 
Documents, Third Series, V, 470-71. 
2 seeds to Halifax, March 20, 1939, ~ . , IV, 417. 
3
~ . , 419. 
4seeds to Halifax, April 1, 1939, ~ . , 574. 
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circumstances, it appeared that even a propo ·sal envisioning 
a mutual assistance pa ct and guarant ees t~ all states bordet'-
ing on the Soviet Union could only at beat hope to dispel 
some of the Sovi et leaders• suspicions of the Western powers, 
let alone achieve an agreement . 
Critic al comment on the latest British pr oposal was 
forth coming almost immediately from Tass, the Soviet news 
agency . On May 10 it stated that, while the British and 
the Fr ench cal led for aid should they become involved in war 
in carrying out their guarantees, they did not offer aid to 
the Soviet Union on a basis of reciprocity should the Soviet 
Union become involved in war in carr ying out any obligations 
she might undertake toward any eastern European state. 1 
As though to set these fears at rest, Cha...~berlain on 
May 10 stated to the House of Commons that it was not the 
intention of the Brit ish gove rnment to have the Soviet Union 
commit herself to war without Britain and Franc e first 
becoming involved . 2 
However, this statement failed to reassure the 
Russians. An article which appeared in Izvestia on May 11, 
and which Seeds reported must be ta ken as re presenting the 
views of the Soviet government, maintained that only in 
concluding a definite alliance could any effective barrier 
be ere cted. It reiterated the Russian fear of becoming 
lR. I . I . A., Soviet Documents, III, 330. 
2Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 
1929-1941, II, 243. 
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involved in war wi tho ut Briti sh and French aid. Furthermore, 
Poland and Romania did not constitute all the nations 
bordering the Sovi'e t Union, and yet the 'vestern powers were 
nrimarily interested only in gua rant ee in g th ese countries. 
The article concl ud ed: 
Once again the U. S . S. R. is put in an unequal 
position. In his speec h in Hou se of Commons on May 10 
Bri tis h Pr i me Minist er sp oke of co-o perat ion and of 
allia nce with t he U. S. s . R. But co-o perat:i.on 
presupposes reciprocity as its na tural basis . Where 
there is no reci procit y there ii no possibility of 
establishing real co-operation. 
Unquestiona bly, the Soviet government was concerned 
that Britain and France, in being selective about guarantees 
to only a few states, were leavin g t he way open for a possil:ie 
German attack against the Soviet Union through the Baltic 
state s . This consideration was dominant in the Soviet 
gover nment · ' s re p ly o.f May 14, which rej e_cted the British 
propo sals of May 18 f or the following reasons: (1 ) they 
did not con tain the pr inci ple of reciprocity with regard to 
a.ny clir 6-.!t s.ttack against the Soviet Union by an aggressor; 
(2) th ey failed to extend th e gua rantee syste m to t he other 
states bordering tho Soviet Union, namely, Finland, Estonia, 
and Latvia; and (3) they invited agg ressio n toward the .S oviet 
Union by failing to ex tend to her a guarantee against direct 
attack and by failing to extend the gua rantee system to the 
Baltic .Sta tes . 2 
1seeds to Halifax, May ll , 1939, Woodward and But ler, 
Documents, Third Serie s, V, 520-21. 
2seeds to Halifax, May 15, 1939, Ibid . , 558. 
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In this same reply, the Sta lin government set forth 
its terms for an agreement. It made it clearly understood 
that any effective barrier against further ag gression could 
only be achieved by (1) the conclusion of a three power 
mutual defense pact between France, Britain, and the Soviet 
Union ; (2) t he extension of guar antees by these three powers 
~o the states of central and eastern Europe threatened by 
ag gr ession, including Latvia, Estonia, and Fin land; and 
{3) a definite agreement between the three powers as to forms 
and extent of assistance to be given to each other and to the 
guaranteed states so that the pact could be effective. 1 
1:rhe Soviet leaders, in effect, were pressing for a 
speoi -fic mill tary pact, along with a definite agreement for 
making it operative should the occasion demand it . It was 
very d~fferent from what the British and French governments 
had thus far propo sed . 
Shortly after Moscow submitted its new proposals, 
there were further consultations between the Western powers, 
new express ions of protest from countries opposed to accept-
ing un solicited guarantees, and new indications of a po ssibJe 
German-Russian rap nrochement . 
Warnings came from both the British and French 
ambassado rs in Ber lin . On May 18 Henderson reported that 
he had little doubt the Germans were doing all they could to 
secure the Soviet Union's neutrality . He had heard himself 
1seeds to Halifax, May 15, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, V, 558-59. 
-47-
i'rom one source that General Sirovy, the former prim e 
minister of Czechoslovakia, had paid a visit to Moscow in 
the interest of Germany . In thi s communication with his 
government, Henderson included a. note written to hiin by the 
' British military attaohe in Berlin which inc l uded very 
I important information given to the attache by a retired 
German officer. It was to the effect that Generaloberst von 
Fritsch had come out of retirement and that after studying 
the present German difficulties he had written a letter to om 
of the highest men in the nazi leadership stating that the 
only solution for Germany was fill agreement with the Soviet 
Union . The attach~ also had heard from many sources tha~ the 
' Gei•man arriiy was "vigorously renewing its eff'orts of a few i 
years ago i to ar•rive at a military allianee with Russia . nl 
-~ 
• 
Much the same warning was forthcoming from the French 
ambassador in Berlin . On May 22 Coulondre reported to his 
government that Ribbentrop thought the Polish state could not 
possibly -,ndure much longer, that it would sooner or later 
be partitioned by Germany and the Soviet Union . According to 
Ribbentrop, such a partition "was closely linked with that 
of a rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow. " Coulondre 
stated that while Hitler was opposed to such an agreement wi ttl 
the Soviet Uni bn, Ribbentrop, the German High Command, and 
the industrialists were pressing for it . He conc l uded that 
although Hitler had thus far resisted these appeals, "there 
1Henderson to Halifax, May 18, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, ~u.m ents, Third Series, V, 594-95. 
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1s nothing to indicate that he will not change his mind. 01 
Although these new warnings did make some impression 
on the British Foreign Office, they failed nevertheless to 
introduce any real sense of urgency with res pect to the early 
conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union . Instead, 
Downing Street during this period was renewing its attempts 
to impress upon Germany the possibility for a peaceful 
settlement of the Danzi g dispute . On May 19, in an interview 
with the German ambassador in London, Halifax warned him 
that any ag gressive move by Germany against any state 
guaranteed by Britain would mean war. However, Halifax 
advanced the opinion that with the passage of time the temper-
ature might drop, making it possible to settle the Danzig 
question. He also sug gested to the ambassador that any 
conciliatory speech by Hitler, without the usual "accom pani-
ments of iI?,sults to democracy," would receive a favorable 
response in British official circles despite t he inevitable 
criticis m that the sp eech was another one of empty words . 2 
Halifax discussed the Danzig question again the next 
day in Paris with Bonnet and Edouard Daladier, the Ft>eneh 
premier. He not only suggested a possible peaceful solution 
of this qu estion, but also again urged the French to examine 
their problems with It a ly in an attempt to woo her away from 
1coulondre to Bonnet, May 22, 1939, French Govern-
ment, French Yellow Book, p . 163 . 
2Halifax to Henderson, May 19, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Docu111.ents, l'hird Series, V, 600-0J . 
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Hitler . Dalsdier did not think that the proper time for 
this had arrived . 1 However, on May 27, 1939, the British 
ambassador in Paris was asked to determine if the French 
government was willing to allow the British to sound out the 
Italians on their willingness to negotiate their differences 
with France . These diplomatic maneuvers concerning Italy 
and France finally resulted in tailure . 2 
These moves by the British Foreign Office would seem 
to indicate that it still had hones of avoiding a confli c t 
by once again apneasing Hitler and Mussolini . There did not 
seem to be any great anxiety about the outcome or the 
Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet government . How-
ever, there was very definite anxiety in both the House of 
Commons and in the French foreign office . 
In a speech in the House of Commons on May 19, 
Dsv1d Lloyd George stated that the British did not know where 
they were nor what they wanted . He said that there was a 
great dP,~f~e, if ooss1ble, to do without Russia, and that 
"for months we have been staring this gift horse in the 
mouth . nJ He asked: 1111'1h.y do we not make up our mind, and 
make it up without any loss of time, that we should come to 
the same terms with Russia as we do with France?"4 
608- 14 . 
1woodward and Butler, Documents, Third Series, V, 
2Hali£ax to Phipps, May 27, 1939, Ibid . , 703 . 
3Nam1er, Diplomatic Prelude, p . 16$ . 
4rb1d . , p . 167 . 
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Winston Chur chill also was critical of the Chamberlain 
government with respect to th e negotiations with the Soviet 
Union . He saw nothing wrong with the Soviet pr oposal for a 
triple alliance. As to the will in gnes s to be associated 
with Russia . only in time of war and not in time of peace, he 
ask ed: "If you are ready to be an ally of Russ ia in time of 
war ••• why should you shrink from becomin g the ally of 
Russia now, when you may by that very fact prevent the 
breaking out of war?" He went on to say that the British 
cabinet would not be extending its obligations i f it gave 
guaran tees to the Balt ic States . "You are in i t up to the 
neck already, and the question is how to make your system 
effective, and effective in time . "1 
This anxiety was also reflected in the French foreign 
office. In cons u ltations between the French and British 
officials on May 21 in Paris concerning the status of the 
negotiation3 with the Soviet diplomats, Daladier expressed 
the view that an agreement with the U. S . S . R. would halt 
instead of provoke a German attack . He exprossed feai• of a 
possible German - Russian agreement and warned that no agr eement 
could be signed with the Soviet government unless it was 
treated on the sarae basis as Poland . He pressed for a mutual 
defense pact with the Soviet Union , stating that since any 
attack en the Soviet Union by Germ.any would most likely not 
occur without bringing Polish and Romanian guarantees into 
p lay, no increased obligations would be assumed by si gning tm 
1Namier, Diplomatic Pre lude, p . 168-69 . 
-51-
pact with the Soviets . Halifax replied that this assumption 
was not correct since the guarantees to these countries would 
not annly if they did not resist German aggress ion . 1 Thus, 
under the guarantee system that the 1estern powers had set 
uo, a German attac k on the Soviet Union with the connivance 
of Poland and Romania would not obligate Britain and B1rance 
to give assistance to a.nyone . 
Some of these fears on t h e part of the Moscow gover n-
ment were oxpressed by Ma1sky to H~lifax in Geneva on May 
22 . He reiterated the previous Soviet criticisms of the 
British and French proposals in that they did not provide for 
assistance to the Soviet Union in case of a German attack 
against her with th e connivance of the Baltic st ates or Pol am 
and Romania . 2 He again stressed that a triple alliance of 
mutual defense between Britain , France, and the Soviet Union 
was the only deterrent to any future German ag gression.3 
On May 27 the British ambassador and the French 
charg~ o '~ffaires presented new proposals to Molotov . The 
Western powers now proposed that in case of direct aggress1.o n 
against any one of the negotiating powers , there would be an 
obligation of mutual assistance. They further proposed that 
the Soviet Union was to give f'ull assistance and supoort to 
1United Kingdom Delegati on to Cadogan , May 21, 1939, 
Woodward and But ler, Documents, Third Series, V, 624- 25. 
2
united Ki ng dom Delegation to Cadogan, May 22, 193 9~ 
Ibid . , 631. 
3rbid . , 633. 
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them should they become involved in hostilities while resist-
ing aggression against another state under the following 
circumstances: (1) by going to the aid of a state, to which 
they had, "in conformity with the wishes of that State," 
given a guarantee or (2) by going to the aid of a state 
which had requested assistance in order to resist a violation 
of its neutrality. France and Great Britain, under like 
circ ums ta n ces, would be obligated to render assistance to the 
Soviet Uni on . It ,,,as also proposed that the three governmen ts 
would negotiate a military agreement concerning methods of 
mutual support and assistance. The pact would continue for 
five years. 1 
These proposals met the Soviet government's wish for 
a trinle alliance of mutual assistance. However , as it 
concerned aid to those countries borderin g on the Soviet 
Union, namely, ~stonia, Finland , and Latvia, the note was 
less s atisfying. Referring to this aspect of the new pr o-
po sals, Molotov told Seeds that it was typical of "that 
1 reserve 1 • . . which was calculated to ensure the maximum 
of talk and the minimum of results." He also criticized the 
propose. l s because they did not provide for two simultaneous 
agreements, one politi cal and the other military . Molotov 
expressed the opinion that Fran ce and Great Britain wanted 
t o continue conversations ad infinitum . 2 
1Halifax to Seeds , May 25, 1939, Woodward and Butl er, 
Documen ts, Third Series, V, 679-80 . 
2 seeds to Halifax, May 27, 1939, Ibid . , 701-02 . 
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In a further meeting with Seeds on May 29 Molotov 
reiterated the Soviet demand for a military pact to be 
si gned simultaneously with the po li ti cal agreement . He also 
raised t he question of the Baltic states which could 
possibly come to an understanding with Germany just as 
Czechoslovakia had done . Seeds re ported Molotov as asking: 
11D1d we mean not to cover German absorption of such States 
nominally with their cons en t?" Seeds re p lied that Britain 
would not impose guarantees on nations against their will . 
Following this interview, Seeds wrote that he was dealing 
with a man "totally ignorant of foreign affairs" and one who 
had s "rather foolish cunnin g of the type of th e peasant . 111 
On May 21 in a speech to the third session of the 
Supreme Soviet, Molotov examined the international situation. 
Ho said that Bri t ain and France had showed some desi r e to 
resist ag gression . However, he went on to say that 0 as yet 
it cannot even be said whether these countries are serio u sly 
desirous of abandonin g the po l i cy of non-re s istan ce to the 
further development of aggression . 11 He said that the willing-
ness of the Western powers to counter ag gression in some 
areas did not mean that aggressive moves could not be made 
in other areas . 2 Here he no doubt had in mind the failure of 
the latest British and Frenc h p roposals to provid e for 
guarantees to Estonia, Fin l and, and Latvia . 3 
1se edo ·co Halifax, May JO, 193 9, Wood ward and Butler, 
Document s, Thi r d Series, V, 722. 
2R. I . I . A. , Soviet Documents, III, 334 . 
3rb 1d . , 337. 
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Therefore, by the end of May th e Br i ti sh and French 
had accepted the principle of a tri pa rtite pa ct in s tead of 
unilateral de clarations . However , the re still re meined the 
serious pro blem of t he number of sta tes to rec e ive guar antees . 
The Russians appeared eager to gua r ant ee t he Baltic states, 
but th e British and French wer e opposed because these 
' 
countries had lodg&d p r~ te sts against thes e pr oposed 
--. 
gua rant eos . The ques tion concerning the Baltic states now 
came to the fo refront in the ne gotiations. 
Baltic States and In dire c t Aggression 
On June 2 the Soviets replied to the Anglo - Fre nch 
proposed agreemen ~ of May 27. Molotov ag ain reiterated t he 
ne cessity for a mutual as $istance pact betw een France, Great 
Britain, and t he Soviet Union; ca lled for guarantees to 
Latvia, Estonia, and Finland , as well as to Poland , Romania, 
Turkey, Greece, and Belgium; and proposed that the politi cal 
agreement should come into for ce s imultaneously with the 
mi l itary agreement . 1 
At about the s ame time as these proposals were 
adv anced, t here were further indications of a possible 
German-Russian agreement . On June l Coulondre reported f r om 
Berlin that he had l earned on good authority that Hitle r was 
willing to risk war only if the Soviet Union r emained neutral . 
Othe r wise, he would give way . Coulondre advised Bonnet 
"that the conclusion of an Anglo - Franco Russia n pact should 
1seeds to Halifax, June 2, 1939, Woodward s.nd Butl er , 
Document s, Third Series , V, 753-54. 
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be pushed forward as quickly as possible . " 1 From Berlin on 
June 8, Henders on reported that "Goring somewhat ominously 
observed that Germany and Russia would not always remain on 
unfriendly terms . "2 And on June 10 Seeds reported from 
Moscow that the German embassy had been ver y active and that 
the German ambassador that same night was leaving for Berlin~3 
The major stumbling block at this sta ge was still the 
question of gu arantees to the Baltic states. The Soviet 
government insisted on British and French gu arantees to these 
countries because it feared that an avenue would be le f t 
ope n ror a possible German attack against the Soviet Union 
without any obligations of assistan ce on the part of the 
Western powers . On June 7 Chamberlain told the House of 
Commons that it was "manifestly impossibl e to i mpose a 
guarantee on States which do not desire i t • • • u4 In an 
earlier statement, however, Churchill had supported the Soviet 
con te ntion, remarking that "there is no sense in havin g a 
crack in the peace diving-b ell . "5 
The reluctance of the three Baltic states to accept 
guarantees was well known. They had lod ged many pr otests 
throughout the course of the Anglo-French talks with the 
1coulondre to Bonnet , June l, 1939, French Governmen~ 
French Yell ow Book, p . 172 . 
2Henderson to Halifax, June 8, 1939, Woodward and 
But ler, Documents, Third Series, VI, 14. 
3seeds to Halifax, June 10, 1939, Ibid ., 22. 
4 Halifax to Seeds, Jun e 7, 1939, ~., V, 788 . 




U.S. s. R. Now as the question became still more important 
they lodged additional protests . On June 7 in a note to the 
British Foreign Office, the Estonian government made it 
clearly understood that "the Sstonian Government would be 
compelled to consider such proposa ls as an unfriend l y act 
directed against the neutrality of Estonia. 111 That very same 
day Estonia and L2tvia signed a non - ag gression pa ct with 
Germany . Within a week it was the Latvian ministe r' s turn to 
lodge his protest against the acceptance of any compulsory 
guarantees . 2 And the British minister in Hels inki reported 
on June 20 that Field Mars hal Baron Mannerheim had told him 
Finland would not accept a compulsory guaran t ee f ro m the 
Soviet Union . He remarked that in this the Finnish people 
were united and that the Finnish army would fight any 
invasion . 3 
With negotiations having hit a snag, Halifa x now 
recalled See ds to London for consultations . 4 However, when 
Seeds beceme ill, his trip home was ca ncelled. It was then 
decided to send Sir William Strang of the British Foreign 
Office ,to Moscow to aid Seeds in the negotiations .5 
On June 8 in an interview between Sir Alexander 
1Halifa.x to Orde, June 17, 193 9, Woodward and But ler, 
Documents, Third Series, VI, 96 . 
2Halifax to Orde, June 12, 1939, Ibid . , 49. 
3snow to Halifax, June 20, 1939, Ibid ., 121 . 
4Hal1fax to Seeds, June 6, 1939, Ibid., V, 776. 
5Halifax to Seeds, June 1, 1939, Ibid . , 787. 
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Cadogan . of the British Foreign Office and the French 
ambassador in London, the question of indirect aggression 
was disc ussed. Cadogan said that Bri tai n wanted cons u lta-
tio n whenever threats dev e loped to the states not receiving 
gua rant ees . The French ambassador did not think that this 
proposal would satisfy the Soviet government . In relation 
to the Bri~ish decision to send Strang to Moseow, Cadogan 
reported th at the Fren ch an bassador "seemed to hanker after 
the idea of sendin g some distinguished personage to Moscow 
to carry on t he negotiations, and he see med to hint that 
t he announcement of the arrangem ents which we had now decided 
on was rather unfortunate . 111 Maisky did suggest to Halifax 
that he should go to Moscow, but Halifax replied .that while 
it would give him much pleasure, he did not feel that he 
could at the time absent himself from London.2 
In Moscow the British and French ambassadors and 
Strang conveyed to Molotov the reply to the Soviet propo sals 
of June 2. The Western powers opposed any guarantees to the 
Baltic states . They complained that whereas the Soviet 
government wanted guarantees given to all countries on the 
Soviet Union 1 s frontier, it made no mention of guarantees to 
Switzerland and the Nethe rlands whi ch were important to the 
security of Great Bri tain and France . As it concerned 
ag gression through states which had received no guarantees, 
1woodward and Butler, Documents, Third Series , VI, 
2Halifax to Seeds, June 12, 1939, ~ - , 51. 
the British and French governments suggested consultations 
between the contracting powers to decide on the course of 
action. The Western powers also re gistered disa pproval with 
the Soviet proposal that the political agreement was to come 
into effect simultaneously with the military egreement . 1 
On June 16 Molotov replied to the Anglo-French 
proposals of the day before and st ated that the refusal of 
the Western powers to extend guarantees to the Baltic states 
would place the Soviet Union in a "position of inequality, 
humiliating for the Soviet Union . • • u2 Since no agreement 
seemed possible on the question of the Baltic area, Molotov 
su ggested that this question be postponed and that the treaty 
be confined to an arrangement for mutual assistance in the 
event of direct aggression . 3 
The Western leaders still refused to guarantee the 
Baltic states beca u se they said these countries were against 
accepting compulsory guarantees . But this was not the real 
reason. Neither did they base their policy on a desire to 
leave open a channel for a possible German attack against 
the Soviet Union because such an eventuality was considered 
to be remote by the British chiefs of staff . 4 One wonders 1£ 
they based their poli cy upon a refusal to face the possibility 
1Memorandum to Seeds, June 12 , 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, VI, 34-39. 
2seeds to Halif'ax, June 16, ill£ · , 86. 
3seeds to Halifax, June 17, 1939, ~ . , 90 . 
4woodward and Butler, 
646. 
Documents, Third Series, V, 
-59-
of a German•Soviet agreeMent. Was it that they didn't want 
t o pay a price for Soviet colla~oration which might have 
entailed a growth of Soviet power in central Europe? Schuman 
appears to be correct in stating that "it wa.s not that t he 
Western diplomats loved the 'i ndependence' of the Balti c 
States, but that the y feared and hated the Soviet colossus 
even whi le they sought its help. 111 
New proposals dealing with the question of the 
Baltic states were sub mitted to Molotov on June 21 by the 
British and French .ambassadors. 2 Molotov replied the next 
day stating that the new proposals were unacceptable. He 
again emphasized that any treaty must include a listing of 
the guaranteed states plus the pro vision for a common 
guarantee by Br~tain, France, and the Soviet go vernment to 
all eight states mentioned by that government in its draft 
of June 2. In answer to a question by the French ambas sador 1 
Molotov replied that he would consider a proposal that the 
guaranteed states be listed in a separate document.3 
With negotiations now clearly deadlocked, there were 
hars h words from both sides. In an interview with Maisky on 
June 23, Halifax asked him if the Soviets really wanted an 
agreement. In answer to Maisky who had asked why Halifax 
had asked this question, the latter replied: "Because ••• 
1schuman, Night Over Europe, p . 2.51. 
2
seeds to Halifax, June 22, 1939, Woodward and Butler, 
Documents, Thi rd Series, VI, 140-42. 
3Ibid., 143. 
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throughout the negotiations the Soviet Government had not 
budged a single inch and we had made all the advances and 
concessions . " Halifax W6nt on to remark that th e communist 
way of ne gotiating was ver y similar to that of the Nazis . 1 
On June 29 Zhdanov, Chairman of th e Forei gn Affairs 
Commission of the Supreme Soviet, published an editorial in 
Pravda. He expressed the belief tha t the Western powers 
did not want a trea t y on terms of equality with the Soviet 
Union . He wrote that t he negotiations had been goin g on for 
seventy-five days and that sixteen of these had been used by 
the Soviet gov ernment preparing answers to various English 
proposals while the remainin g fifty-nine days had been spent 
by delays on the part of the English and French . He asked: 
"Ia it a serious endeavor to utilize the negotiations as 
well as the delay i n the ne gotiations for some different 
purposes havin g nothing in common with t he creation of a 
front of paci f ic powers ?" He wrote that the reluctance of 
Britain and France to guarantee the Baltic states against their 
wishes was an "artificially inve n ted 'stumbling bl oc k' in the 
negotiations. u2 
On July l new Anglo-French proposals were submitted 
to Molotov. The West er n powers now agreed that guarantees 
to the Baltic states would operate automatically in case of 
1Halifax to Seeds, June 23, 1939, Woodward and 
But l er, Documents, Third Series, VI, 152-53 . 
2 . R. I. I. A., Soviet Documents, III, 352-53. 
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a direct attack against them . It was suggested that the 
list of guaranteed states should be printed in a special 
annex to the treaty . However, the Western powers now 
called upon Moscow to guarantee Switzerland and Holland also . 
Molotov remarked that the Soviet Union had no diplomatic 
relations with these countries . Sin ce this presented a new 
problem, the Kremlin now considered the possibility of 
establishing normal relations with the Netherlands , Luxemburg, 
and Switzerland . Molotov also pointed out that the proposals 
did not cover the case of indirect aggression similar to 
Germany's action against Czochoslovakia . 1 
In its reply on July 3, the Soviet ~nion agr ee d to 
the inclusion of the list of states in an unpubl is hed 
protocol, but refused to include in this list Holland , 
Switzerland, and Luxemburg . It a l so proposed that the 
guarantees should function automatically in the event of 
either direct or indirect ag gression . I ndirect aggression, 
as it was to be defined in the unpublished protocol , would 
be understood to mean "an internal coup d'etat or a reversal 
of policy in the interests of the aggressor . n2 
Although there was now agreament on many points, 
there were still obstacle s to be overcome , es pecial l y that 
con cerning a definition of indirect aggression . The Times 
commented on July 5 that "the negotiations now s tand like 
1seeds to Halifax, July 1 , 1939, Woodward end 
Butle r , Documents, Third Series, VI , 230 - 31 . 
2seeds to Halifax, July 4, 193~ Ibid . , 251 . 
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an .iceberg: the e i gh t-nin ths t hat is agreed lies submer ged 
and at times f or gotten; the ninth still defying agreement, 
sticks ou t in a r emarkably cra ggy forrnation . "1 
In a meet in g on J uly 8 Molotov still insisted ( 1) 
that th e Nether lands, Switzer land, and Luxemburg could not 
be incl ud ed in th e list of guaranteed states without some 
further compensatio n for the Soviet Union; (2) that the words 
"direct or indirectn should be included in t he published 
pact with the definition of indirect ag gres sion incl uded in 
a secret annex; and (3} that t he entr y into f orce of the 
po litical agre ement was dep endent on the conclusion of the 
military agreement . 2 In another meetin g on Jul y 9, much the 
same ground was covered with still no agre ement reac hed on 
the basic questions still at iss u e.3 
At t hi s point in the ne gotia t ions, the definition 
of what cons .ti t u ted indirect aggression was all-important . 
The Soviets wanted it defined to cover any action accepted 
by any of the gua rant eed states "under threat or force by 
another Power, or without any such threat involving the u se 
of territory and forces of t he State in question for pu r po ses 
of aggressi on against that State or ag a in st one of the 
contracting part ies, and con sequ ent l y involving the los s of, 
by th at State, its independence or violation of its 
1uamier , Dip loma ti c Pr e lude, p . 193 . 
2
seeds to Hali f ax, J uly 9 , 1939 , Woodward and Butler, 
Documents, Third Series, VI, 309 . 
3seeds to Halifax, July 10, 1939, Ibid . , 310-12 . 
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neutrality."1 The British sought to define the word 
naggression" to cover the question of indirect aggression . 
It was to be understood as ncovering action accepted by the 
State in question under threat of force by another Power and 
involving the abandonment by it of its inde pendence or 
neutrality . • • n2 
At a meeting on July 16, Molotov was told that 
Britain and Franco agreed that a definition of indirect 
aggression and the words "direct and indirect " could be 
included in Article I and published . Nevertheless, the 
Western powers still insisted that indirect aggression should 
be defined so as to cover only action ta ken by a state 
against its will under the threat of force which endangered 
its independence and neu tralit y . This in ef f ect was a re -
jection of t he Soviet f or mula which also incl ud ed the words 
"without threat of f orce," and "use of territory and fo r ces . " 
The Moscow government wanted to cover a case like that of 
President Hacha who surre ndered to Hitler shortly before the 
German occupation of Pr ague . The Western power s said they 
wanted to avoid any formula which could be construed as 
signifying the intention of interfering in another countr y 's 
internal affair . The Western powers now drop ped Switzerland, 
Netherlands, and Luxemburg from the list of guaranteed 
states. 
1seeds to Halifax , July 10, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, VI, 313 . 
2Hal1fa.x to Seeds , July 6, 1939, ~ . , 277 . 
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For his part, Molotov at t hi s same meeting insisted 
on th e acceptance of his formula for indirect ag gression . 
He r epeated that there could not be two agreements but only 
one politic a l-militar y- agre ement . He made it clear t ha t 
unless the Western powers agreed to this ther e was no need 
of continuing t he conversations . He also asked whether 
Britain and France were willi ng to op en military conversa-
tions . 1 
The question of indirect ag gression was a vital one. 
Russia feared t hat Germany by an internal coup d'etat could 
seize cont rol of some of the bordering states . She wanted a 
definite agreement with t he Western powers whereby Germany 
would be countered if such a move were attempted . 
The English and French made a further concessio n on 
July 23 when they agreed to the simultaneous entry into for ce 
of the politi cal and mi l itary agreements . 2 As it concerned 
the issue of indir ect aggression, however, neit her side 
of fe red any compromise, althou gh the re were indications that 
the Qua! d'Ors ay was wil lin g to agr ee to the Soviet formula .3 
Nevertheless, Molotov sug gested that, since t fle question of 
indire c t ag gres slon did not raise "insuperable diffic u lties," 
militar y talks could begin . Seeds sought to impr ess Molotov 
with the necessity for first concludin g the politi cal 
1s eeds to Halifax , July 18, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, VI, 375-77• 
2se eds to Halifax, July 24, 1939, Ibid., 457. 
3seeds to Halifax , July 22, 1939, Ibid . , 450. 
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agreement . But Molotov was unyielding and asked if the 
British and French were ready to begin military talks before 
the question of indirect aggression was resolved. 1 
Following this interview with Molotov, Seeds wrotet 
"It is, I am convinced , saf'e to say that every meI11ber of 
the Politbureau consider the present Britis h Government as 
imbued with a spirit of 'ca pit ulating' if possibl e to Axis 
Powers but that the most infl uential section thinks, 
nevertheless, we can be squeezed by our press and public 
and by Russian pres su re, relentlessly applied, into an 
agreement with this country . 112 
Collapse of Negotia ~i ons 
The climax of the ne gotiations was fast approachin g . 
On July 27 Seeds informed Molo tov that the Western powers 
were ready to begin military talks immediately. In answer 
to a query from Molotov, Seeds replied that Britain would 
not change its formula for indire ct ag gression.3 Another 
but unsuccessful attempt t n r esolve the issue of indirect 
ag gression was made on Augus t 2.4 
The British and French military missions arrived in 
Mos cow on August 11, 193~ and there were soon ominous 
signs that they had come in vain . On August 19 Pravda 
lseeds to Halifax, July 24, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, VI, 457-59. . 
2flli . , 461. 
3seeds to Halifax, July 28, 1939, Ibid . , 521-22 . 
4seeds to Halifax, August 3, 1939, Ibid . , 572. 
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published an article which had previously appeared in the 
London Daily Worker of August 7. It sought to show that 
Great Britain was secretly negotiating with Germany concern-
ing a settlement of the Danzig question . It was to be 
another Munich . That same day an announcement was made 
of a trade agreement between Russia and Oermany. 1 
Before leaving for Moscow, the British military mission 
was instructed to go slowly with the conversations and to 
watch the progress of the political negotiations . They were 
to treat the Russians with "reserve" until the political 
agreement was reached . 2 Seeds regretted this because he 
reported that .the "Soviet military negotiators were really 
going out for business.u3 
Military talks began on August 12, and Marshal 
Klementi Voroshilov, the Russian war commissar, inquired 
about the powers of negotiations the .missions had . Neither 
military mission had been given plenipotentiary powers. In 
fact, the British mission didn't even have written 
credentials.3 
At a further meeting, Voroshilov also wanted to know 
whether Poland would permit Russian troops on their soil . 
I 
Although they already knew the answer, the British and 
French delegations did not give it to Voroshilov . Instead 
1L. B. Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, p . 203 . 
2seeds to Halifax, August 13, 1939, Woodward and 
Butler, Documents, Third Series, VI, 763. 
3seeds to Halifax, August 12, 1939, ~ . , 674. 
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the talks were recessed until a r eply could be given . The 
British mission had been informed before leaving London that 
the Poles opposed any direct relations with Russia for fear 
that the Russian troops once in would never leave. 1 Just 
before its mission left for Moscow, the French had tried to 
persuade the Poles to accept Rus sian military aid . The answer 
was "no." Leon Noel, the French ambassador in Warsaw at the 
time, has written that the Daladier cabinet had no right to 
believe in the possibility of a Polish-Soviet military 
agreement . In fact, it was apoarent to Noel that General 
. 
Joseph Doumenc, the head of tbe French mission, was told to 
avoid such questions by the Russians. 2 
Following Voroshilov•s inq uiri es, the French on ce 
again ap pr oached Beck. He remained obdurate. On August 19 
he gave Noel the following note: 
This is for us a question of prin cipl e . We neither 
have, nor wish to have, a military agreement wi th the 
u. s. s. R. We concede to no one, under any form, the 
right to discuss the u s e of any part of our territory 
by foreign troops . 3 
However, this unwillingness on the pa.rt of the Poles 
to accept Soviet military ai d was not the decisive facto r 
which doomed the negotiations . They collapsed with the sign -
in g of a nonaggression pa ct between Germany and Russia on 
1woodward and Butler, Documents, Third Series, VI, 
772. 
2 Namier, Dipl omatic Prelude, p . 205, quotes M. Leon 
Noel, L'A~ression allemande ce ntre la Pologne (1946), 
pp . 420- 2 . 
3 Ibid . , p . 209. 
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August 23 . Shortly t hereaf ter the Allied military missions 
le ft Moscow . Fai lure was complete and irrevocable . 
CHAPTER III 
GERMAN-RUSSIAN EGOTIATIONS 
Significance of German-Polish Relatio ns 
The growing European crisis over Danzig, and the 
ensuing realignment of powers, soon made it evident that 
the Soviet Union occupied the pi votal position. She shortly 
became the object of ke en diplomatic attentions by two 
opposin g camps: the Western powers and Germany . Britain and 
France were the first to sound out the Soviet governmen t on 
an agreement. But even after intensive and pr olon ged 
ne gotiations t .1e attempt ended in failure. This was in 
contra st to Germany ' s success in reaching an agreement with 
the Soviets , even though ~egotiations were started somewhat 
later and the contacts between their diplomats were relatively 
fewer. 
However, any understanding of German-Russian relations 
in the period preceding the outbreak of World War II is 
impossible without a consideration also of Germany 's rela-
tions with Poland after the Munich Pact. With t he Sudetenland 
firmly in his grasp , Hitler next began to concentrate on 
Danzig . In a meeting on October 24, 1938, at Ber chtesgaden, 
Ribbentrop told the Polish ambassador that Hitler desired a 
clarification of Germany's relations with all her neighbo rs. 
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As it concerned Germany and Poland, the first thing to be 
considered was the qu estion of Danzig. Ribbent ro p told Lipski 
that "Danzig was German-- it always had been German, and it 
would always re main German . " The Gerllle.n foreign minister 
looked toward a solution based primarily on the return of 
D~nzig to Germany and a German extra-territorial motor highway 
and railway across the Corridor. 1 
In a reply to these proposa ls, Beck pr oposed a 
bilateral Polish -Ger man agreement to r epla ce the League of 
Nations guarantee concernin g Danzig . This agreement should 
guarantee not only the status of the Frfie City of Danzig 
but also the rights there of the German majority and the 
Polish minority . Beck warned that any other solution or 
attempt by Germany to incorporate the Free City into the 
Rei ch "must inevitably lead to conflict." 2 
The question of Danzig was discussed again on January 
5, 1939, at Berchtesgaden by Beck and Hi tler. At this time 
the Fuehrer expressed the view to Beck that Danzi g should 
return to Germany politi call y but remain with Poland economi -
cal ly. Hitler also mentioned the necessity for Ger man access 
to Danzig across the Corridor . For his part, Beck said the 
-problem of Danzig was "extraordinari l y difficult" as Polish 
public opinion had to be taken into special account.3 
lR. I . I . A. , Documentsz 1939-1946, I, 88. 
2 Ibid ., 92 . 
3 Ibid ., 99-100. 
- 71-
It was becoming increasingly clear that Poland had no 
intentions of yieldin g Danzig to Germany . Ribbentrop visited 
Warsaw later that month and i n an interview with Beck again 
pressed for a solution to the · Danzig question; but he met 
with no success. 1 Again in Berlin on March 21, Ribbentrop 
met with the Polish ambassador and onc e more pressed for 
J 
Polish acce ptan ce of the German propo~als on Danzi g and the 
Corridor . Ribbentrop said that "up to now the Fuehrer could 
not but be astonished at the peculiar attitude adopted by 
Poland on a number of questions . It was important that he 
should not gain the impression that Poland simply _did not want 
to reach a settlement. 112 It will be noticed that these demands 
on Poland followed only a few days the occupation of Prague 
by Germany . 
On March 26 Lipski told Ribbe ntro p that Poland was 
willing to do everything to facilitate communication and 
trade between Germany and East Prussia across the Corridor. 
He ad ded that "all facilities granted on Polish territory 
could, however, only exist within the limits of Polish 
sov ereignty, and therefore extraterritorial status for ways 
of communication could not be considered . " As for Danzig, 
Pol and again proposed a joint Polish-German guarantee . 3 
These concessions did not satisfy the Berlin govern -
ment . The next day Ribbentrop summoned Lipski and prote sted 
l R. I. I. A. , Documents, 1939-1946, I, 104 . 
2Ib1d . , 110. 
-
3~ . , 119- 20. 
against what he said had been demonstrations and speeches 
against Germany in Danzig . 1 Thereupon the Gorman ambassador 
to Poland, Hans von Moltke, was told by Beck that "any inter -
vention by t he German government aimed at chan gi ng the stat u s 
quo in Danzig will be regarded as e.n aggression against Poland . " 
Beck sugge sted that the proble m cou ld be settled by an 
agreement betwe en the two powers .2 
It was fairly obvious by now that despite the increas-
ing pressure Germany had apµl ied since October, 1938, a 
deadlock was at hand . Ribbentrop had more than once stated 
the German demands with respect to Danzig and th (J Corridor, 
and Beck in turn had consistently rejected them . Some have 
tried to explain the failure in ter ms of the personalities 
involved . One of these was Baron Ernst von Weizsacher, state 
secretary in the German Foreign Office, who later wrote: 
"And how indeed coul d two persons of such outstandin g vanity 
as Beck and Ribbentrop be ex pected to w~rk to ge ther?") 
With nego t iations deadlocked, the crisis began to 
heighten . Chamberlain announced in the House of Commons on 
March 31 that Great Britain and France were extending 
guarantees to Poland . This was followed on April 6 by an 
announ cement in London of a reciprocal Anglo - Polish defensive 
agreement which was to be in force pending the completion of 
1Namier, Diplomati c Prelude, p. 100 . 
2 Ibid . , p. 101 . 
3Ernst von Weizsacker, Memoirs of Er nst von Weizsacker , 
trans .· John Andrews (Chica go: Henry Regnery Co., l9.5J.}, 
pp . 172- 73. 
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a permanent treaty. 
On April 11 in a directive to his Com.~ander-in-Chief, 
Hitler stated that although Germany sought to continue good 
relations with Poland, a threatening attitude by that nation 
might drive Germany to seek a final settlement. In this case 
it would be necessary to smash the Polish armed forces, seize 
Danzig at the very outset, and seek to limit the war to 
l 
Poland . This was followed on April 27 by a memorandum. to 
the Warsaw government in which Germany stated that Poland's 
new agreement with Great Britain was inconsistent with the 
German - Polis h Declar ation of January 26, 1934. 2 In a speech 
to the Reichstag on the following day Hitler condemned the 
Anglo-Polish agreement and said that the responsibility for 
the unrest in Europe lay with the "propaganda in the service 
of international warmongers. n3 • • 
A reply to Hitler was forthcoming from Beck on May 5 
in a speech to the Polish parliament . He said that Germany 
had asked Poland to make unilateral conces sions which "a 
self-respecting nation does not make . " Although his country 
· was still willing to conduct negotiations directed toward a 
peaceful settlement of the problems with Germany, she would 
not have peace at any price.4 
l R. I . I . A., Documents, 1939-1946, I, 131 . 
2 . 
.!!?.!!!·, 254-61 . 
3
.!!?.!!!, •., . 237-38. 
4~., 270 . . , 
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Poland's intransige nce definitely influenced Germany's 
foreign policy. It has since been ascertained that Hitler 
told his commanders-in-chie f on Augu st 22, 1939, t hat he had 
first wanted to fight in the West. However, the failure to 
reach an agreement wit h Poland on Danzig altered this plan. 
He further stated: 
It became clear to me t hat Poland would attack u s in 
case of a conflict with the West. Poland wants access 
to the sea. The further development became obvious after 
the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear 
to me that under the circumstances i conflict with Poland 
could arise at an inopportune time. 
The possibility of a German- Russian agreement now 
becam e known to the Fren ch ambas sador in Berlin . On May 7 
he reported to his government the essential details of a 
conversation that had taken place the day before between a 
member of the embassy and one of Hitler's close associates. 
"Were you not str uck, in his last speech," remarked the 
German, "by the fact t hat he made no re.ference whatever to 
Ru ssia?" And becoming exc i ted, he exclaimed: "There have 
already been three partitions o.f Poland; well , believe me, 
you will witness a fourth 1112 
The se word s were indeed prophetic . Al t hough Hitler 
had not perhaps definitely made up his mind , he was at least 
giving some consideration to an understanding with Russia, 
should the situation demand it. 
1or.rice of u. s . Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of 
Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggressio n (Was hington: 
U. S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946}, III, 582. 
2French Government, French Yellow Book, pp . 148-49. 
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Eddies in the Diplomatic Stream 
Germany and Russia had many times 1n the past found 
it advantageous to maintain friendly re l ations. This was 
especially true after World War I when both were pariahs 
among the family of nations. With Hitler's rise to power, 
however, Russia's friendship was spur·ned and Uational -
Socialism dedicated itself to a war against the communist 
menace . Nevertheless, even during the early years of naz i 
rule there were statements by leading Nazis that the day 
might come when friendly relations with the Soviet Union 
could again prove beneficial to Germany. In writing to a 
young German Communist during this period, Paul Joseph 
Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister, said that "the day 
will come when Nazism and Communism will fight side by side 
the decadent powers of the West." 1 And in .1934 Hitler 
remarked to Hermann Rauschn1ng: "Why should I not conclude a 
pact with Ru ssia when, by doing so, I can improve our positio n? 
An alliance with Russia will be the last trump card in my 
hand . Maybe this will become the most daring gamble of my 
life . ,,2 i 
Despite these sentiments, a German- Russian unde r-
standing see med very remote during the early years of naz i 
rule when the Soviet Union, out of fear of Germany, sough t 
security in alignment with the Western powers . However, as 
York: 
1T. II. Tetens , German~ Plots wi t h the Kremlin ( Now · 
Henry Schuman, Inc . , l9 3), p . Sl . 
2 
~ - . p. 51. 
.. 
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every .Hitler success underscored the rel uctance of Britain 
and Fra nce to stop him, Soviet leaders were fo rced to 
reaporaise their policy of collective security. This was 
particularly true after Munich. 
The stage appeared to be set for a possible shift in 
Soviet foreign policy. ' There was an awareness on the part of 
the German Foreign Office, shortly after the Munich Pact, 
that a cris is had develo pe d between the Soviet Union and the 
Western democracies. They felt that the Kremlin was now 
confronted with an important problem: Were the Allies now 
establishing Germany as a counter-weight aga inst her? Would 
it not serve Russian interests now to come to some kind of 
agreement with Germany? 1 
Later events were soon to show that the leaders in the 
Kremlin were pe rha ps indeed asking themselves such questions. 
During the summer of 1938, in fact, even before Munich, 
Litvinov e.nd Friedrich Werner Oount von der Schulenb urg , the 
German ambassador in Moscow, reached an understandin g to end 
the derogatory statements aimed at the two heads of state. 
There was a further understanding in October to the effect 
that the press and radio of both states should stop condemning 
the other country. Gustav Hilger, former counselor of embassy 
in the German embassy in Moscow, has written that "the 
consequences of the agreement were the first visible indica-
tion that a change in the rel ations between the Soviet Union 
1c. De Witt Poole, "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," 
Foreign Affairs, XXV (October, 1946), 141. 
.. 
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and Germany was in the offing. nl A further indicat:1 on of 
closer relations was fort h coming in late December, 1938, with 
the renewal of the German-Soviet trade agreement . 2 
German leaders, however, were to get a much clearer 
sign of Russian intentions from a spee ch Stalin made on 
March 10, 1939 . He said that the members of the United States, 
British, and French press would have Russia be l ieve that 
Germany was ready to mar ch into the Ukraine . "It looks · as 
if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo," continued 
Stalin, "was to incen se the Soviet Union against Germany 
without any visible grounds . " He fur t her added that Soviet 
foreign poli cy stood "for peace and the strengthening of 
business relations with all countries • • • . so long as these 
countries maintain l i ke relations with the Soviet Union, and 
so lon g as the y make no attempt to trespass on the interests 
of our country . "3 
The si gni ficance of this speech evidently was not 
lost on the Germans. At the time of the signing of the 
Germ.an-Russian Pact, Ribbentrop told Stalin that Hitler had 
inter pr eted the speech as expressing his desire for better 
relations with Germany . Stalin remarked to Ribbentrop: 
'*That was precisely my intention."4 And in a speech to the 
1n1lger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, pp. 288- 89. 
2 Ibid., 289. 
3R. I. I. A. , Soviet Doc-u.ments, III, 319- 21 . 
4A. Rossi, The Russo - German Alliance 
June, 1941 {Boston: The Beacon Press, 19 
1939 .. 
-78-
Supreme Soviet on August 31, 1939, Molotov said that contrary 
to the views held by some short-sighted people in Russia, 
Stalin ''even then suggested the possibility of different, 
unho stile, and good-neighbourly rel ati ons between Germany and 
the USSR. 01 
The importance of Stalin's speech of March 10, and 
the other friendly contacts which had taken place between the 
Germans and the Russians, was enhanced on April 17 when Alexei 
Merekalov, the Soviet ambassador in Berlin, made his first 
visit to the Wilhelmstrasse since presenting his credentials 
on June 5, 1938. The ambassador expla ined that his government 
had not exploited the difficulties between Germany and the 
Weste rn democracies. Weizsacker also related that Merekalov 
voiced the view that 0 there exists for Russia no reason why 
she should not live with us on a normal footing. And t'rom 
normal the relations might become better and better . " 
Weiz sacker for his part said that "we had always had the 
desire for mutually satisfactory commercial relations wi t h 
Russia." 2 
The stage was now set for further contacts between t he 
two go vernments. Although no final decision appeared to have 
been made concerning the nature of t ho ultimate outcome of 
the warming - up process, both governments nevertheless viewed 
suc h conta ct s as worthwhile and profitable . 
1R. I. I. A., Soviet Documents, III, 366. 
2Raymond Sontag and James Beddie {eds.), Nazi-Soviet 
Relations (Washington: U. S. Government Printing 
Off ce, 1 -2. 
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Path to Agreement 
Just when Hitler or Stalin finally decided to make 
an agreement has been debated . Hilger has written that no one 
could possibly determine at which time either dictator made 
a decision . 1 Others have said that Stalin's speech of March 
10 was decisive. 2 Whatever the answer might be, there were 
further indications during the months to come of a possib l e 
German-Russian rapprochement . 
Some officials of the German foreign ministry heard 
that in April, 1939, Hitler was thinking of coming to terms 
with the Soviet Union . It was said that Hitler respected 
Stalin more than any of his other adversaries and conside r ed 
him as his equal . Further impetus in this direction was 
forthcoming with the dismissal of Litvinov on May J . The 
question was asked: "Was it because he @tali ~ wanted t o 
get rid of him as an exponent of Soviet friendship with th e 
Western democra c ies?"3 
In an attempt to evaluate fu ll y the meaning of 
Litvinov•s dismissal, Hilger was recalled to Berlin where 
on May 10 he had an interview with Hitler . Hi l ger expla i ned 
that he th ought Litvinov had been dismissed be cause he had 
failed to get an understanding with Great Britain and France 
and that Stalin thought these two countries were anxious t o 
1Hi lger and Meyer , In compatible All ie s, ·p . 288 . 
2Ros si, Russo - German Al l ian ce, pp . 9- 10 • 
.3weizsa eker, Memoir s , p . 186 . 
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see the Soviet Union "pull the chestnuts out of the fire for 
them in the event of war . " In answering Hitler's question 
concerning Stalin's readiness to come to an agreement with 
Germany, Hilger simply mentioned Stalin's speech of March 10. 
Hitler gave no views of his own at this time. 1 
The Soviet ambassador's visit to th e Wilhelmstrasse 
was followed by others from the ;,oviet diplomats in Berlin . 
On Mey 5 a meeting was held in Ber lin between Geor gi Ast akhov, 
counselor of the Soviet embassy, and Dr. Karl Schnurre, an 
economic expert in the German Foreign Offi ce, at which time 
there were f urther discussions on the relations between the two 
countries. Astakhov asked if the Germans would soon resume 
the trade talks which had been broken off that February . He 
also attempted to determine whether L1tvinov' s dismissal 
would cause any change in the German attit ude toward the 
Soviet Union . 2 
Astakhov and Schnurre met again on May 17 . This 
time Astakhov remarked on t he lack of German press attacks 
on Russia , and the lac k of conflicts in the fo rei gn policy 
between the two coun t ries . In answer to a question concern-
ing the Anglo- Soviet negotiations, he said significantly 
"that under the pres ent circ umst an ces the result desired by 
England would hardly be achieved . ") 
1H1lger and Meyer, In com2atib l e Allies, p . 296. 
2sontag and Beddia, liazi - Sov1et Relations 2 1939-1941, p . 3. 
3 
.!!?.!.£•, P • S . 
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The results of these first meetings, although only 
exploratory, did establish a basis for further talks. It 
was soon evident t hat, whereas the Germans were primarily 
interested in a commercial agreement, the Russians desired 
also a political agreement . On May 20 .Schulenburg called on 
Molotov in Moscow to resume the trade negotiations . Molotov 
replied that the unfavorable progress of the talks earlier 
in the year had given the Soviet government the imp~ession 
that the Germans had not been earnest in the mat t er and that 
it 0 had only played at negotiating for political reasons . 11 
Molotov went on to say that the Soviet government would agree 
to resume talks only if the necessary "political bases" for 
the m had first been constructed . He made no atte mpt, 
however, to explain what he meant by "political bases . ,'1 
Before this meeting with Molotov, Schulenburg was 
directed to maintain ''extreme caution . n2 After the mee ting 
he was told to "s1 t tight'' and wait to see if Molotov would 
~peak out more openly.3 The Germans were both puzzled and 
fearful . Schulenburg reported from Moscow on May 22 that 
Molotov apparently awaited definite proposals of a political 
nature . However, he warned that extreme ca u tion was nece s sary 
because he feared that any such proposals by Germany might 
be used by the Kremlin onl y "to exert pr es s ure on Great 
1sontag and Beddie, Nazi - Soviet Relations.? 1939 -
1941, p. 6. 
2s chulenburg to Wei zsa cker, May 22, 1939, Ibid., p . 8. 
3weizsacker to Schulenburg, May 21 , 1939, Ibid . , p. 7. 
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Britain and Fra.nce." 1 
At the end of Ma.y, even with negotiations deadlocked 
between the Western powers and the Soviet Uriion, Weizsacker 
ex pressed the belief that an agreement "will not be easy to 
pr event . " It was his opinion that there was room, however, 
"to inject ourselves with an impendin g and disturbing effect 
by use of a mere unmistakable sort of lang uage." 2 There 1s 
some evidenc e that even Hi tler at this time reared t ha t an 
agreement between the Western nations and Russia would l ead 
to a Russian move against Germany in Poland . 3 And Ribbentro p 
on May 29 expressed the view that the ultimate success 0£ 
any talks with the Mosco w government was "admittedly very 
doubtful . "4 
However stron g th e se German doubt s might have been, 
t he German ambassador in Moscow was advised on May 30 by 
his government that a decision to ne got iate wi t h the Soviet 
Union had been made . 5 In a messa ge to t he State Secretary 
on June 5, Schulenburg again ex pressed a warning concerning 
the Russi an u se of German propo sals to put pressure on Bri tain 
and France. However, it was apparent to him t ha t t he way was 
1s chu lenburg to Weizsacker, Ma~22, 1939, Sontag and 
Beddia , Nazi- Soviet Relations, 193 9- 19!!!, p . 8. 
2
we1zsacker to Schulenburg, May 27, 193 9 , ~., p . 9. 
3c. De Witt Poole, "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," 
Foreign Affai rs , XXV ( October, 1946), 142 . 
p . 10 . 
4sontag and Beddi e , Nazi- Sovi et Relations, 1939 - 1941, 
p . 1.5. 
~veizsacker to Schulenburg, May 30, 193 °, Ibid., 
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still open for further negot1ations. 1 
The Germans now pressed for a resumption of the trade 
talks. On June 17 Hil g er had a meeti ng with Anastas!. 
Mikoyan, the Sovie t commissar for foreign trade, and explained 
that Germany was willing to resume t he trade talks . Mikoya n 
rejected the propos ~l, saying that the Germans had not yet 
given oompl<:·ce ass urances that in resuming the talks they 
were not carr yin g on a political game . 2 It was only after 
further consultations t hat the trade talks were r ·esumed in 
Ber lin. An· announcement to this effect appeared in the entire 
Soviet press on July 22.3 
Me anwhile, on the political front t here were increased 
indications of a. possible German- Russian agreement. On 
June 15 the Bulgarian minister in Berlin informed . the German 
Foreign Office that Astakhov had paid him a visit on June 14 
without any app arent reason. He reported Astakhov as saying 
that, among the possible alternatives, a rapprochement with 
Ger many we.a "closest to the desires of the Soviet Union ." 
Astakhov added t hat "if Germany would declare that she 
would not attack the Soviet Union or that she would conclude 
a nonaggression pact with her, the Soviet Union would 
1
s chulenburg to Weizsacker, June 5, 1939, Sontag and 
Baddie, Nazi- Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, p. 19 . 
2Ti ppelski rch to German Foreign Office, June 18, 
1939, Ibid . , p . 23 . 
3schulenburg to German Foreign Office, Jul y 22, 
1939, ~ - , p . 32. 
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1 probably refrain from concluding a treaty with Eng land. " 
Shortly thereafter Sc:b.ulenburg told Molotov that 
Ger-many desired normal relations with the Soviet Union . As 
evidence of this, he cited the lack of anti-Russian sentiments 
in the -German pr ess, the signing of nonaggression pact s with 
the Baltic countries, and the desire for the resumption of 
economic negotiations. Molotov was also t ol d that the 
Germans considered the Berlin Treaty of 1926 st ill in force . 
Schulenburg complained, however , that ho did not understand 
what Molotov meant when in the la s t conversation he spoke 
a.bout "creation of a new basis of our r ela tionships . "2 On 
June 30 Schulenburg was instr ucte g not to carry on any 
additional politioal conversations un til further no t ice . 3 
Both sides still appeared to be somewhat wary and 
su sp icio us of the other's motiv es . The Germans feared that 
any T)roposals made by them would be u sed by the Russians to 
press th e Engli sh and French . The Russ ian s feared that 
German y's main objectiv e in t he sporadic convers a tions was 
the disruption of negotiations between the Soviet government 
and the Western powers . But regardless of the sus picio n , 
the international s i t uation was such that neither wanted to 
disrupt t he diplomatic pr ob ings because of' a belief t ha t 
·
1so nta g and Beddia, Nazi-Soviet Rel ation s, 1939-1941, 
pp . 20-21. 
2schu l enburg to Ger man Foreign Office, June 29, 1939, 
Ibid., p . 26 . 
3weizsacker to Schulenburg, June 30, 1939, Ibid . , 
po . 27-28. 
some satisfactory arrangement might ensue. 
By the end of June neither had Molot ov explained 
.further what he meant by a political understandin g nor had 
the Germans advanced proposals of a political nature whi ch 
they knew the Russian s wanted . But this impasse was later 
broken. 
In a meeting on July 26 in Berlin with Astakhov and 
Barb arin, th e Soviet trade representative, Sch nurre mentioned 
the possibi lit y of close collaboration with the Soviet 
government. He said he could envision this hapoening in 
three stages: (1) collaboration 1n economic affairs, 
(2) improvement in political ~elations, and (3) the re-
estab l ishment of good political relations . Schnurre s aid 
that this third s t ep was possible "because controver s ial 
problems of foreign policy ••• did not ••• exist in the 
't<hole area from the Baltic Sea to th e Black Sea and the Far 
Ea st . " He pointed out also that both countries were opposed 
to the capitalistic nations . "It would appear paradoxi cal," 
said Schnurre, "1!' t he Soviot Union as a Soci a list State, 
were to s ide with the 1vestern democracies." 1 
A memorandum of this dis cussion was forwarded to 
Schulen bur g in Moscow on July 29 . He was advised to see 
I-lol o tov and to gi ~,e further exp lane. tions con cerning German 
intentions. As regards t he Polish question, he was in -
s t r ucted to say that "we would be prepared to safeguard all 
1sontag and Badd ie, Uazi - Soviet Relations , 1939- 1941 , 
PP• 32-3 3. 
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Soviet interests and to reach an understanding with the 
Moscow Government." Germany was also ready to recognize 
Soviet interests in the Baltic states . 1 
At the end of July Hitler received plans from the 
Army general staff con cerning an attack on Poland . Shortly 
thereafte r , he designated August 26 as the date ror the 
attack against Poland . 2 Coulondre had reported from · Berlin 
on June 1 that General Wilhelm Keitel, chief o·f the general 
s taff , and General Walter von Brauchitsh, coromander - in - chief 
of the army, had told Hitler that Germany would not have 
much chan ce of winning a war if Russia were a participant 
against her . 3 If the report were true, then upon fixing a 
definite date for the attack on Poland Hitler put himself in 
a position where an agreement with Russia became an extremely 
urgent matter . At the beginning of August Hitler made it 
in cr easingly clear to the Soviet leaders that he desired an 
agreement with the Soviet government . 
On August 2 Ribbentrop told Astakhov t hat better 
relations between Germany and the Soviet Union could be 
secured if Russia refrained from interfering in German 
internal affairs and also abandoned a policy directed at 
vital German interests. Ribbentrop stated that there was no 
problem between the Baltic and the Black seas which could 
1we1z s acker to Schulenburg, June 29, 1939, Sontag and 
Baddie, Nazi - Soviet Relations, 1939- 1941, p . J6. 
2Ross1, The Russo - German Alliance, p . 21 . 
3coulondre to Bonnet, June l, 1939, French Government, 
French Yellow Book, p. 171 ~ 
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not be solved and that as to the . Baltic "there was room 
for the two of u s • • • and that Russian interests by no 
means needed to clash wit h ours there . " Then with reference 
to Poland, Ribbentro p declared that, i f nee d be, matters 
could be settled 1n a week . However, he hinted at an agree-
ment with t he Sovi et government concerning th e fate of Poland.1 
In a note to Schulenburg, Ribbentrop said t hat if Moscow 
should of f icially ex pr ess a desire for improving relations, 
t hen the German gov ernment "would be interested in an early 
definite . settle ment . "2 
Germany's intentions, relative to an agree ment with 
the Soviet Union, were spel l ed out in some detail by 
Schule nburg to Molotov on August J . Schulenburg reaf f irmed 
the plan that Schn urr e ha d outlined to Asta khov and Barbarin 
on July 26 for an improvement in German- Russian relations. 
In answer to Molotov's reque sts ror assura nces con cerning 
Germany's good intentions, Schulenbur g said that Germany was 
read y to "so ori ent our beha vior with regard to the Baltic 
states, if occasion arose, as to safeguard vital Soviet Baltic 
interests . " And as for Poland, Germany hoped for a pea ceful 
solution; but if this were impossible, Soviet interests here 
would also be prote cted . For his pa rt, Molotov told · 
Schulenburg t hat his governm ent sought better relations with 
l Ribbentrop to Schulenburg , August 3, 1939, Sontag 
and Baddie, Nazi - Soviet Relations, 1939- 1941, p . J8 . 
2 Ibid., P• 39. 
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Germany.1 
The Russians were playing a masterful diplomatic 
hand . They not only had succeeded in carrying on negotiations 
simultaneously with both the Western democracies and Germany , 
but the y had managed al so to avoi d any definite commitments 
to either side. Their great advantages were t he apparent 
inability of London and Paris to accept the possibility of a 
German - Russian !:_aporochement and the increasing evidence th a t 
Germany desired a pol itical agreement with the u. s. S. R. 
T"nerefore, the Russ ians were in a position to make th e best 
possible agreement with th e highest bidder . They were no 
longer th e beg gars; they were now the choosers . 
Even as l a te as early August th e Soviet leaders had 
the Germans guess in g about a German- Rus sian agreement . 
Schulenburg reported to Berlin on August 4 t hat he thou ght 
the Soviet government was t he n determined to si gn with t he 
British and French, provided they met a ll Soviet demands . He 
went on to sa y t hat it would take a considera ble eff ort on 
the part of Germ.any to rea ch an agreement with Russia . 2 
However, a few days later he reported that t hroughout the 
ne gotiations with the western diplomats Molot ov ha d sat "like 
a bump on a lo g . " He al so wrote : "I believe t hat we put a 
rew go od fleas in the ears of the Soviets, anyhow . 113 
1s chulenbu r g to German Forei gn Office, August 4, 1939t 
Sont ag and Bedd1e, Nazi - Soviet Relatio ns, 1939-1 941, pp . 40-
41. 
2 Ibid . , p . 41. 
3s chulenburg to Schl ie p, Augu st 7, 1939, Ibid., p . 42. 
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There was a further clarification of views on August 
10 in a meeting in Berlin between Schnurre and Astakhov . 
Schnurre was told again that the Soviet government desired 
improved relations with Germany . Schnurre remarked that 
since his government was still in the dark concerning Soviet 
interests, the time was not yet at hand for a discussion of 
concrete problems . However, as it concerned Poland, Schnurre 
said that because of new provocations it was possible that 
"a solution by force of arms would have to take place . " 
Astakhov was told that it was important for Germany to know 
the position of the Soviet government on the question of 
Poland before any adjustment of interests between the two 
countries could be effected . Since German interests in Polatxi 
were limited, they need not conflict with Soviet interests, 
even in the event of war. 1 
With the Germans now pressing the Russians for 
definite information conc erning their vital interests, the 
Soviet leaders made a definite move . On the same day that 
it started military talks in Moscow with the western military 
missions, the Kremlin agreed to begin discussions with the 
Germans on outstanding questions .2 
Ribbentrop wasted no time . On the same day that the 
Soviets agreed to conduct discussions, he forwarded to 
Schulenburg in Moscow a list of important items for 
1sontag and Beddia, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, 
pp . 44-45. 
p . 48. 
2schnurre to Schulenburg, August 14, 1939, Ibid . , 
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communieation to Molotov. Once again the Russians were to 
be told that ideological differences did not constitute a 
barrier to friendly relations; that there was no problem 
between the Baltic and Black ss~e which could not be settled; 
that the ca pi talistic powers were the enemies of both nations; 
and that the Polish problem was such as to "make a speedy 
clarification of German-Russian relations desirable." The 
German ambassador was asked at this time to secure a meeting 
for Ribbentrop with Stalin. Molotov was to be told that such 
a meeting was desirable since it could hasten an agreement. 1 
The Germans were now knocking hard on Moscow's door, 
but the Soviet leaders were not to be hurried . Schulenburg 
saw Molotov on August 13 and reported that Molotov now 
believed that the Germans were sincere in seeking better rela-
tions with the Soviet Union; In this conn_ection, Molotov 
asked what steps Germany was willing to take toward influ-
encing Japan in bettering relations with the Soviet Union. 
But of much greater importance was his inquiry concerning 
Germany's attitude toward the conclusion of a German- Russian 
nonaggression pact . As it concerned Ribbentrop's trip to 
Moscow, Molotov said that it would require adeq uate prepara-
tion if any results were to be forthcoming . 2 Schulenburg now 
1Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, August 14, 1939, Sontag 
and Baddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, pp . 50-52. 
2
schulenburg to German Foreign Office, August 16, 
1939, ~ . , pp. 54-56. 
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thought that an agreoment was possible . 1 
The German reply to Molotov's inquiries was forth-
coming immediate l y . The next day Ribben tro p instructed 
Schulenburg to tell Molotov that Germany was ready to sign 
a nonaggression pact and also to extend joint guarantees to 
the Baltic states . An unmistakab le note of urgency was 
struck in th e part of the fo llowin g instr u ctions which 
Schulenbur g was requested to read to Molotov: 
The Fuhrer is of the opinion that, in view of the 
present situation, and of the possibility of the 
occurrence any day of serious incidents (please at 
this point explain to Herr Molotov that Germany is 
determined not to endure Polish pr ovocation indefinite-
ly), a basic and rapid clarification of German-Russian 
relations and the mutual adjustment of the pressing 
questions are desirable. For these reasons the Rei ch 
Foreign Minister declares th at he is pr epared to come by 
plane to Moscow at any time after Friday, August 18, to 
deal on the basis of full powers fro m the Fuhrer with 
the entire compl ex of German-Russian questions and, if 
the occasion arises, to sign th e aporopriate ~reaties . 2 
The very nature of the talks now assumed a note of 
extreme urgency, with Germany pressing for an immediate 
agreement . Under these circumstances, it was not difficul t 
for Stalin to negotiate a favorable agreement. 
Final Agreemen ~ 
There was now a frantic effort by the Germans to 
conclude a pact . Molotov told Schulenburg on August 18 that 
the "actual prerequisites" for an understanding were present . 
1schulenburg to Weizsacker, August 16, 1939, Sontag 
and Beddie, Nazi - Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, p. 57. 
P • 58. 
2Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, August 16, 1939, ~ . , 
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He stated two major provision s for the improvement or 
relations: (1) conclusion of a trade and credit agreement 
and (2} the conclusion or a nonaggression pact together with 
a special protocol defining the vital interests of the 
signatory parties . Molotov also suggested that both sides 
prepare a draft of a nonaggression pact as well as the secret 
protocol . With regard to Ribbentrop's trip, Molotov again 
said it would require preparations . 1 
The pace was still too slow f or the Germans . On 
August 18, Schu lenbur g was instru c ted to press Molotov about 
iramed1ate permission for Ribbent rop to proceed to Mosco w 
because the ?c lis h crisis was at such a stage that hostili-
ties could break out any day . Molotov was to be told that 
an economic agreement had been reached that very day in 
Berlin thus fulfilling one of the Soviet government's first 
conditions for improved relations. Ribbentrop was ready to 
proceed to Moscow with full powers to conclude a nonag gre ssicn 
treaty . 2 
On August 19 Schu l enburg saw Molotov twice. At the 
first meeting Molotov again said that Ribbentrop's trip 
required preparation. About a half hour after his first 
conference with Molotov, Schulenburg was asked to see him again. 
He was now handed a Soviet draft of a nonaggression pact 
1schulenburg to Ribben tro p , August 18, 1939, Sontag 
and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, PP • 59- 61. 
2R1bbentrop to Schu l enburg, August 18, 1939, .!£!si•, 
pn . 61-62. 
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and told that Ribbentrop could come to Moscow either on 
1 August 26 or August 27 . 
But this date was too late for the Germans, and a 
different tack was now tried. No less a personage than 
Hitler himself now entered the picture . On-August 20 he 
sent Stalin a message in which he accepted the Russian draft 
of the nonaggression pact, but considered it important that 
questions concerning it should be clarified as soon as 
possible . Hitler informed Stalin this could be done if 
Ribbentrop could go to Moscow. Hitler warned that ''the 
tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable," 
and suggested that Ribbentrop be received in Moscow on August 22 
or at the latest August 23 . 2 
Schulenburg conveyed this request to Molotov at 
3:00 P.M. on August 21.3 A reply was delivered two hours 
later in which Stalin agreed to receive Ribbentrop on 
August 23 . 4 
Stalin's reply did not come any too soon to please 
Hitler . Goering has told how Hitler called him one morning 
about three o 1 clock and expressed concern over the lack of a 
1schulenburg to German Foreign Office, August 19, 
1939, Sontag and Baddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, 
pp . 64-65. 
2Ribbentrop to Schulenburg, August 20, 1939, ~., 
pp. 66-67 . 
1939, 
3schulenburg to German Foreign orrice, August 21, 
Ibid . , PP• 67-68 . 
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reply . About one half hour later, the phone rang again. It 
was Hitler jubilantly announcing that Stalin had agreed to 
receive Ribbentrop . l The story 1s told that upon receiving 
Stalin's message, Hit ler went wild with joy, hammered the 
wall with both fists, and shouted triumphantly, "Now I have 
the world 1n my pocket1" 2 
Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow on August 23, and the 
agreement, although signed on August 24, was dated August 23. 
It contained the following seven major terms: (1) Neither 
party was to undertake any act of force, any aggressive act 
either alone or in conjunction with other powers, against 
each other . (2) If one of the parties were to come under 
the attack of a third power, the other contracting party would 
not supnort the third Power in any way. (3) The two parties 
would consult with each other concerning questions of common 
interest . (4) Neither would join any group of powers directed 
against the other part. (5) In cas e of disputes arising 
between the two powers, there would be a friendly exchange 
of views or, if necessary, an arbitration commission to 
achieve an agreement . {6) The agreement was to last ten 
years, and could be extended another five years provided 
one of the parties did not denounce it one year before its 
expiration date. (7) The agreement was to be ratified in 
the shortest possible time. It was to become effective 
1c. De Witt Poole, "Light on Nazi Foreign Policy," 
Foreign Affairs,XXV (October, 1946), J.42. 
2Hilger and Meyer , Incompatible Allies, p. JOO. 
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immediately upon its signature, 1 
In addition to this agreement , there was signed also 
a -secret additional proto col in which Germany and Russia 
agr eed to spheres of influence. As it concerned the Baltic 
states, the northern boundary of Lithuania was to represent 
the boundary of the spheres of influence between the two 
nations. In Poland, the rivers Nar e~, Vistula, and San, were 
to constitute the boundar y between the two contracting parties . 
The questi on of an independent Polish state was to await 
further political deve l opments. The problem, however, was 
to be resolved by friendly agreement. As to southeastern 
Europe, Russia's primary interest in Bessarabia was 
r ecognized. 2 
With these agreements, Germany was now prepared to 
launch t he grand assau l t against Poland . Within a few day s , 
Euro~e was plunged into war . World War II had begun . 
1sontag and Beddie, Nazi - Soviet Relations, 1939-1 941, 
pp . 76- 77. 




Any conclusions relative to the German-Russian Paet 
of 1939 must necessarily take into consideration the basic 
foreign policies pursued by the interested powers during the 
1930•s. This was a period of German and Italian aggression, 
British and Fronch capitulation, and Russi an efforts at 
collaboration with the West . Germany was a problem to 
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union , but these three nations 
had failed to find a common basis for cooperation against 
German ag gression. The result was a growth of mutual 
suspicion and distrust . 
With the seizure of Prague, there were soon outward 
indications that the Western powers were abandoning appease-
ment. They sought to underline this chan ge of policy by 
extending guarantees to three of the smaller nations of 
eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, and Greece) which seemed 
threatened by new German aggressive moves . These guarantees 
were given, however, without prior consultations with the 
Soviet government and it was only later that Bri tain and 
F:rance sought to enlist Soviet aid in defending these states. 
In giving the guarantees, London and Paris deprived 
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themselves of some freedo m of movement in their negotiations 
with Russia. Since it doesn't seem credible that British 
and French leaders were unaware of the nature of this move, 
the question must then be asked: Why did they take this 
ste p which placed them in a diplomatic straightjacket, 
especially as it con cerned future negotiations with the 
Moscow government? 
There is an indication here that the Western l eaders 
never contemplated any definite and binding agreement with 
Moscow. At the very outset, and at the time when there was 
perha p s still some possibility of an agreement, London and 
Paris advanced proposals which did not indi cate any strong 
desire for comprehensive pact . And this was at a time when 
they were in no strong position to bargain and when the 
Soviet leaders thought that the Western democracies were 
still capabl e of further appeasement . Under thes e cir cum-
sta n ces, only the most precise proposals incorporating a 
triple alliance, a military convention, and iron-clad 
guarantees to all possible victims o.f German aggressi on had 
any chance of Soviet acceptan ce. Such proposa l s were 
advanced not by London and Paris, but by Moscow. 
This was the type of pact that the Soviet leaders 
pressed upon the democratic states from the very beginn i ng 
of the negotiations. The Western powers hesitat ed at almost 
every turn, and although they made one con ce ssion after 
another, they alwa ys seemed to leave a safe mar gin of dis-
agreement which required further negotiations . 
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Somehow the English and French reasons for not 
acc epting the Soviet proposals do not seem to ring true . 
Certainly there were times during the negotiations when the 
behavior of the British govem .ment was prejudicial to the 
conclusion of an effective pact with Moscow . This would 
seem to be indicated by the numerous British efforts to 
effect a Fran co- Italian rapprochement; by the talks in London 
in late July and early August between Sir Horace Wilson, 
chief industrial adviser to the British government, and 
Helmuth Wohl that, one of Goering's close advisers; by the 
so l icitous attitude of the British ambassador in Berlin; and 
by the relu ctance to press Poland and Romania to accept some 
form of Soviet assistance . 
The argument can be advanced that the British and 
French, after making one concession after another , had 
reached the point where no .further concessions could be made 
without endangering the sovereignty of other states . This 
was the reason given by the English and French for rejecting 
the Soviet definition of indirect ag gression . This argument 
would be more valid if it could be shown that England and 
France had always been concerned about the inde pendence and 
integrity of other states . 
The simple fact i s that the y had not . Britain and 
France not only had failed to take effective action against 
Musso l ini's s eizure of Ethiopia and Hitler's seizure of 
Austria, but they had actually been participants in the 
Munich Conference which l ed to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia . 
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In none of these instances had London and Paris shown any deep 
consideration for the integrity of these nations. However, 
when it oame to pressing Poland, Romania , and the Baltic 
states to accept conditions which could possibly lead to a 
pact w1th Russia, they balked . The question is inevitable: 
Why were they now so eager to respect the wishes of these 
small nations, whereas in the past they had ignored the wishes 
of others? 
The answer is inescapable . It was not in the .intere st 
of the Western democracies to force these countries to accept 
terms which could have possibly le d to a comprehensive agre &-
ment with the Soviet Union . While no doubt Russian aid 
would have been welcomed in the event of war , the Western 
nations were unwilling to pay Stalin's price because they 
feared the possible growth of Soviet power 1n central Eur ope . 
Instead, they sought an agreement whi ch, while devoid of any 
close ties with the Soviet Union, could at the same time be 
used to bring pressure upon Germany to accept a negotiated 
settlement of all outstanding problems with the West . 
London and Par is might have achieved their goal if 
there had been no possibility of an agreement between Germany 
and Russia . However, their chances for a limited agreement 
became progressively worse with every new German overture to 
the Russians . With Hitler finally pressing for an agreement, 
Stalin concluded that an agreement with Germany instead of 
with the Western democracies would better serve the interests 
' of the Soviet Union . Under these circumstances, Britarn and 
--.,. .. ' 
,.. 
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France found it impossible to compete with Hitler and a 
diplomatic defeat followed . 
One of the chief aims of the Russian leaders all 
along was to prevent the formation of an anti-Soviet coalition 
among the capi t alist nations. To this end, they fir3t 
cultivated close ties with Germany and then, with Hitler's 
rise to power, sought friendly ties with Britain and France. 
It was highly desirable in the scheme of t h ings that Soviet 
Russia should align herself either with the Western nations 
or Germany . And if it ever became possible to join one 
bloc and at the same time avoid war , that would be even better . 
This possibility presented itself when the English 
and French gave guarantees to Poland, Romania, and Greece. 
In effect, the commitments indirectly gave Russia the advantages 
she would have bargained for in negotiations with the Western 
powers . More than this, however, the stage was now set for 
a possible war between the Western democracies and Germany. 
In the circumstances, a nonag gression pact between Germany 
and the Soviet Union became a distinct possibility because it 
would be mutually satisfactory . For Germany it could mean tre 
major enemies in the war would be on only one front, the 
west, and for the Soviet Union it could mean achievin g 
neutrality in a war which could possibly result in the self -
destruction of the capitalist nations . 
The leaders in the Kremlin did not look upon such 
an eventualit y as a certainty but only as a possibility. 
They could not be entirely sure that the Western nations would 
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in the end honor their obligations to Poland, Romania, and 
Greece. There was still some suspicion that if the 
opportunity presented itself, Britain and France would once 
again appease the dictators. Therefore, she had to guard 
against this because it could possibly have resulted in a 
united front against her. 
This possibility was minimized, however, at the very 
moment when the men in the Kreml in realized that there was a 
chance for an agreement with Gor.many. From this point on, 
apparently Moscow's first choice was not an agreement with 
the Western democracies but with Germany . Nevertheless , the 
Soviet leaders had to guard against concluding a premature 
pact, because they .feared Hitler would use it to .force con -
cessions from England and France . In order to achieve this 
objective, the Soviet government conducted negotiations 
independently and simultaneously with Berlin ~nd the Western 
capitals. Only when the European situation, with particular 
reference to Danzig, had reached the stage where the Western 
nations were likely to become involved 1n war with Germany, 
did Stalin decide to conclude the pact with Hitler . 
Stalin had little trouble decidin g when the moment 
had arrived to conclude the pact with Germany. During August 
Hitler became increasingly impatient about the Danzig 
question to the point where he was willing to agree to almost 
any terms the Russians proposed for a nonaggression pact. 
There was certainly rnore than a hint to Stalin that following 
any agreement 'between the two nations Germany would take 
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aggressive action against Poland . 
The Moscow government was now 1n a position to 
conclude a very favorable agreement with Germany . Here was 
the opportunity for Stalin to get from Hitler what he could 
not possibly get from Britain and France: a sphere of influence 
in the Baltic states, a part of Poland, and the chance for 
penetration in t o the Balkans - -all without becoming engaged ir-
war . 
Stalin had expressed the view on March 10, 1939, that 
the role of appeasoment pursued by the Western democra cies 
was directed at embroiling Germany and Russia in a war. This 
fear was nresent among some of the Russian leaders even during 
the subsequent negotiations with Britain and France . They 
as swned that a double - cross by the British and French govern -
ments was a distinct possibility . In the end, however, i t 
,ms Stalin, and not Britain and France, who K~de the final 
appeasement which permitted Hitler to annex still more t erri -
tory and to wage war against the West instead of the U. S . s . R . 
With the signing of the German- Russian nonaggression 
pact, Europe and then almost the entire world were plunged 
into war . 
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-APPENDIX 
"August 23, 1939. 
"Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germani and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics 
"The Government of the German Reich and 
the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany 
and the u . s.s.R., and proceeding from the fundamental provisions 
of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between 
Germany and the u . s.s.R., have reached the following agree-
ment: 
"Article I 
"Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist 
from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any 
attack on each other, either individually or Jointly with 
other powers . 
"Article II 
"Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object 
of belligerent action by a third power, the other High 
Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its supµort to this 
third power. 
"Article III 
nThe Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall 
in the future maintain continual contact with one another for 
the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information 
on problems affecting their common interests. 
"Article IV 
"Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall partici-
pate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly or 
indirectly aimed at the other party. 
"Article V 
"Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contract-
ing Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties 
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shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through 
friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the 
establishment of arbitration commissions. 
11Article VI 
"The present treaty is concluded 1.'or a period of ten yes.rs, 
wi th the proviso that, in so far as one of the High Contract-
i ng Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expira-
tion of this period, the validity of this treaty shall 
automatically be extended for another five years. 
"Article VII 
"The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest 
possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. 
The agreement shall enter into foroe as soon as it is signed . 
"Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages. 
"Moscow, August 23, 1939. 
"For the Government of the 
German Rei ch: 
v. Ribbentrop 
"With full power of the 
Government of the u.s.s.R.: 
V. Molotov 
"Secret Additional Protocol 
"On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact 
between the German Rei ch and the Union of Socialist Soviet 
Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the 
two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations 
the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of 
influence in Eastern Europe . These conversations led to the 
followin g conclusions: 
n1 . In the event of a territoria l and political rearrangement 
in the areas belon ging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania), the nort he rn boundary of Lithuania shall 
represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany 
and the u.s.s.R . In this connection the interest of Lithuania 
in the Vilna area is recognized by each party. 
n2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrange-
ment of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres 
of influence of Germany and the U. S. S. R. shall be bounded 
approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and 
Sen. 
"The question of whether the interests of both parties make 
desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and 
how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely 
determined in the course of further political developments . 
"In any event both Governments will resolve this question by 
means of a friendly agreement . 
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"J . With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called 
by the Soviet sido to its interest in Bessarabia . The German 
side declares its complete political disinterestedness in 
these areas . 
"4• This protocol shall be treated by both parties as 
strictl y secret . 
"Moscow, Augu st 23, 1939. 
" For the Government 
of the German Reich: 
v. Ribbe ntrop 
"Plenipotentiary of the 
Government of the u1s.s.R. : V. Molotov" 
1s onta g and Beddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations. 1939 -1 941, 
(Washin gton ~ U. s . Government Pr1nt1ng Orfice, i94tlJ , pp . 70-
78. 
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